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I. OVERVIEW
EN a buyer repudiates a sales contract, unjustifiably rejects con-
tract goods or revokes acceptance of them, or is otherwise in
breach prior to final acceptance of the goods, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides the aggrieved seller with four remedial damage alter-
natives. These alternatives are: (1) actions for the unpaid contract price
* Copyright reserved by Roy Ryden Anderson and Callaghan & Company. This
Article is a draft of a chapter that will appear in a book on damages in Uniform Commercial
Code cases, authored by Professor Anderson and to be published by Callaghan & Company.
** B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., Yale
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
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under section 2-709; 1 (2) the contract price minus the resale price under
section 2-706;2 (3) the difference between the market price at the time and
place for tender and the unpaid contract price under section 2-708(1); 3 or
(4) the profit plus reasonable overhead under section 2-708(2). 4 This Article
focuses on the last alternative, the profit formula, with the purpose of dem-
onstrating that the courts for good reason regard the profit formula as the
most important Code damage remedy for sellers. Further, this Article ex-
plains the intricacies of proving at trial a recovery based on the profit
formula.
Professors Summers and White begin their discussion of section 2-708(2)
with the statement: "This section addresses a group of problems that the
drafters did not formulate well and presumably did not understand well." 5
The end their discussion with woe: "It is a section of great promise, still
largely unfulfilled. It began life as a graft on 2-708(1), bloomed before it was
enacted into law, and was finally enacted in such a gnarled mutation that it
now barely accommodates some of the cases for which it was originally
designed."'6
Although there is much truth in this statement, the situation is not quite
so bad. Actually, commentators have had a great deal more difficulty assess-
ing the parameters of section 2-708(2) than have the courts. All have been
greatly aided by the remarkable early articles by Professor Harris, 7 whose
discussion of sellers' damage remedies under the Code sharpened the focus
on the profit formula as the most important of those remedies. 8
The profit formula is indeed the dominant damage remedy. It applies to
1. U.C.C. § 2-709 (1977). The price action is severely restricted by § 2-709 if the buyer's
breach occurs prior to the time the goods have been accepted. The price action is available
only if the goods are not reasonably resalable or have been lost or destroyed after the risk of
loss has passed to the buyer. Id. § 2-709(1).
2. Id. § 2-706; see id. § 2-703 (conditions under which § 2-706 recovery available).
3. Id. § 2-708(1).
4. Id. § 2-708(2) provides:
If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of
damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would
have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental
damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs rea-
sonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
5. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 274 (2d ed. 1980).
6. Id. at 288.
7. See Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and
Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 66 (1965) [hereinafter Harris, Sales
Act Results]; Harris & Graham, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Cali-
fornia Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1965); Harris, A Radical Restatement of the
Law of Seller's Damages: New York Results Compared, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1965);
Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Michigan Results Compared,
61 MICH. L. REV. 849 (1963); Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for
Total Breach of Contract, 60 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1962) [hereinafter Harris, General Theory].
8. See also Childres & Burgess, Seller's Remedies: The Primacy of UCC 2-708(2), 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 833 (1973), for a general guide to interpreting and applying the Code's lost-
profit measure of damages.
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all sellers who are left at "lost volume" as a result of the buyer's breach.9 A
lost volume seller is one that has fewer customers than it can supply. A
breach by one of its buyers causes a decrease of one transaction in the vol-
ume of its business and the economic loss of the profit associated with that
transaction. The seller does not make up for this loss by reselling the goods
to a buyer who would have purchased from the seller in any event. No
subsequent resale of the goods by a lost volume seller should be applied to
mitigate the damages owed by the breaching buyer unless the resale was one
that the seller could not have made except for the buyer's breach.' 0 It is for
this reason that the resale formula of section 2-706 will not compensate the
lost volume seller. The resale formula measures damages on the basis of the
contract price minus the resale price, thereby crediting the buyer with the
full amount received by the seller on a subsequent resale of the goods. The
resale formula will be compensatory only when the calculation is based on a
true resale, one that the seller could not have made but for the buyer's
breach. I I By definition, a lost volume seller is one that resells the goods to a
party to whom it could have sold regardless of the breach.
12
Professor Hawkland succinctly describes the lost volume seller situation
as follows:
A simple illustration of a situation in which damages based upon the
difference between the market and the contract prices do not make the
seller whole is one in which the subject of the sale involves goods that
sell for a standard price. For example, suppose an automobile dealer
sells a car to a buyer for $7,500, its list price; that the buyer repudiates
the deal and refuses to take possession of the car, or pay for it, and that
the seller sells the same car to another customer for $7,500. In this
case, the seller would not want to use the resale rule of section 2-706 to
measure his damages, because there is no difference between the resale
price and contract price. Nor would he want to use the rule for dam-
ages stated in subsection 2-708(1), for there is no difference between the
market and contract prices. This might suggest that the seller had not
been injured by the repudiation, but the seller has lost a profit because
of the breach. If the buyer had not breached, the seller would have sold
two cars instead of one, for it may be safely assumed that the second
purchaser would have bought another car. Stated differently, if it is
assumed that the seller has an unlimited supply of cars at his disposal,
the buyer's breach costs him a sale, because no matter how many cars
the seller may sell in a given period, he would have sold one more had
9. Professor Harris coined the term "lost volume" to describe this particular phenome-
non. See Harris, General Theory, supra note 7, at 599-600. The terminology has become wide-
spread in both judicial decisions and commentary.
10. See Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 725 n.6, 36 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1190, 1194 n.6 (Me. 1983).
11. See generally Anderson, Plunging the Depths of the Seller's Resale Remedy Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 411 (1985) [hereinafter Anderson, Plunging
the Depths].
12. See Anderson, Mapping the Labyrinth of Sellers'Damages, 10 LITIGATION 10, 12-13
(1983); Harris, Sales Act Results, supra note 7, at 80-83.
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the buyer not breached.13
A retail seller of fixed-price goods is typically an example of a lost volume
seller. Such a seller represents one group definitely contemplated by the
drafters of section 2-708.14 Retail sellers of fixed-price goods, however, are
but one example. Lost volume sellers may include wholesalers of goods at
varying prices. The test is whether the seller has fewer customers than it can
supply or, in other words, more goods than it has customers. A typical
example of the lost volume seller that recurs with frequency in the reported
decisions is the so-called middleman or jobber. In the present context a mid-
dleman or jobber refers to a seller who never actually acquires the goods.
The seller does not sell over the counter or out of stock, but rather purchases
goods from a source of supply to accommodate orders of buyers. Clearly, so
long as this type of seller has a source of supply that exceeds the volume
provided by customers, a breach by any customer places the seller in a lost
volume situation.
13. 3 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-708:04, at 331-32(1982). Professor Hawkland goes on to say:
In one sense, however, this may not be true, because buyer number one may
have sold his car to buyer number two and thus have deprived the seller of that
opportunity, if no breach had occurred. That possibility involves assumptions
that should not be made lightly in favor of a breaching party, and a heavy bur-
den should be placed upon him should this speculation be offered to defeat the
seller's claim to his lost profit.
Id. at 332. Professor Hawkland's qualification is perhaps in response to recent commentary
from economist lawyers that few sellers are actually left at lost volume because of a buyer's
breach. One premise for this extraordinary suggestion is that the breaching buyer could have
sold the contract goods to the purchaser so that the seller could not have made both sales. To
date, the commentary has not caused pause in judicial decisions, and it should not cause undue
concern to find once again an analytical gap between actuality and economic cost curves. The
most widely cited commentary on point is a remarkable article, Goetz & Scott, Measuring
Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1979). See also Goldberg,
An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 283 (1984);
Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC Section 2-708(2) (One Profit for the Reseller),
24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 697 (1973). In responding to another facet of this commentary one
scholar said:
To be a genuine lost-volume seller, a seller must establish that he in fact had the
capacity to enter into additional contracts, that he had the ability to successfully
negotiate a second sale with the person who purchased the goods following the
original buyer's breach, and that his marginal expenses of taking on an addi-
tional contract would not have been any higher than the expenses he would have
incurred on the original transaction. This criticism may be accurate from an
economist's perspective, but it asks too much of the law.
G. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8-18 (1981)(footnote omitted).
14. U.C.C. § 2-708 comment 2 (1977) states:
The provision of this section permitting recovery of expected profit including
reasonable overhead where the standard measure of damages is inadequate, to-
gether with the new requirement that price actions may be sustained only where
resale is impractical, are designed to eliminate the unfair and economically
wasteful results arising under the older law when fixed price articles were in-
volved. This section permits the recovery of lost profits in all appropriate cases,
which would include all standard priced goods. The normal measure there
would be list price less cost to the dealer or list price less manufacturing cost to
the manufacturer. It is not necessary to recovery of "profit" to show a history of
earnings, especially if a new venture is involved.
1024 [Vol. 40
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Section 2-708(2) also applies to all the cases in which the seller properly
discontinues, or fails to begin, manufacture of goods because of a buyer's
breach. These cases will be referred to as the incomplete goods cases.' 5
Whether or not a seller should mitigate damages following a buyer's breach
by completing manufacture of the goods is governed by section 2-704.16 As
a rule of thumb, a seller should probably complete manufacture of the goods
in any case in which it reasonably appears at the time of the buyer's breach
that the goods can be resold at a profit, at a price that exceeds total direct
costs of manufacture.
The courts have come to apply the profit formula of section 2-708(2) as a
matter of course to all lost volume and incomplete goods situations. Since
these two situations almost certainly account for the vast majority of actual
mercantile cases, the profit formula of section 2-708(2) is indeed the most
important of sellers' damage remedies. The comparative difficulty of prov-
ing both entitlement to and the amount of section 2-708(2) damages, how-
ever, has probably discouraged sellers from making use of the profit formula.
Proving damages under section 2-708(2) is appreciably more difficult than
is proving them under the resale formula of section 2-706. The fact that
section 2-708(2) does not enjoy a popularity fairly reflective of its standing is
no doubt also attributable to the provision's confusing meaning. Read liter-
ally, the provision cannot be applied correctly. This frustrating irony is
enough in itself to discourage the busy practitioner in the preparation of a
case. The statute provides that the buyer may recover reasonable over-
head,17 thereby presumably indicating that such a thing as unreasonable
overhead exists, which the seller may not recover. As discussed below, how-
ever, reasonableness of the seller's overhead is generally irrelevant to the
question of damages owed by the breaching buyer. Further, the statute
reads that the buyer is entitled to receive a credit for proceeds from resale of
the goods. '8 This language must be read out of the statute in order for sec-
tion 2-708(2) to be correctly applied to lost volume sellers. Happily, the
legislative history of the provision 19 supports this result, and the courts have
been quite willing to follow that history and logic rather than the precise
articulation of their respective state legislatures. Much of the linguistic con-
fusion probably stems from the fact that the profit formula in goods cases
was rarely used under pre-Code law, and thus, the drafters had little experi-
ence with it.20
15. The reference to incomplete goods situations is intended to encompass sellers who
manufacture from component parts as well as those who manufacture from raw materials.
Although occasionally component sellers are discussed separately from sellers who manufac-
ture from scratch, the distinction is one without a difference. The factors determining an in-
complete goods situation are whether, as a result of the buyer's breach, the seller failed to start
or discontinued manufacture of the goods and whether this decision was proper from a mitiga-
tion of damages standpoint. See 3 G. WALLACH, supra note 13, at 8-16; see also U.C.C. § 2-
704 (1977) (mitigation of damages).
16. U.C.C. § 2-704(2) (1977).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
20. See Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 397-98, 285 N.E.2d 311, 313-14, 334
1986] 1025
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It is important to note that section 2-708(2) establishes as a prerequisite to
the availability of the profit formula proof that the market formula in section
2-708(1) "is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance
would have done."'2 1 Fortunately, the reported decisions make clear that
neither lost volume sellers nor sellers left with incomplete goods as a result
of the buyer's breach will have serious difficulty in proving this prerequisite.
The market formula of section 2-708(1) will compensate neither of these sell-
ers. The market formula hypothecates that the seller will be able to resell
the goods at the market price at the time and place for tender, as provided in
the formula. Since an actual resale of the goods is presumed, the market
formula suffers the same compensatory inadequacies for the lost volume
seller as does the resale formula. 22 Further, because a resale of completed
goods is the presumption underlying section 2-708(1), the market formula is
not intended to apply to, and will not compensate, sellers left by the breach
with incomplete goods.23 The profit formula of section 2-708(2) is clearly
the compensatory damage formula in both lost volume and incomplete
goods cases. The formula promises to become more widely used under the
Code as the trial bar becomes more familiar with the mechanics of the calcu-
lations under the formula and as the courts continue to demonstrate a flexi-
ble attitude toward problems of proof thereunder.
II. THE PARAMETERS OF THE PROFIT FORMULA
A. The Lost Volume Seller
As with the resale formula of section 2-706, the market formula of section
2-708(1) will not work to compensate a lost volume seller because the mar-
ket formula presupposes a resale of goods at the market price provided by
the formula. Also, since in the lost volume seller situation the goods can be
resold after a contract breach, the seller will not be entitled to an action for
the price under section 2-709.24 Thus, the profit formula not only works
well to make whole the lost volume seller, it is the only available compensa-
tory damage alternative under the Code.2 5
When the seller is able to establish its lost volume status, the courts have
uniformly held that damages under the market formula do not place the
seller in the same position it would have occupied had the breach not oc-
curred.2 6 In one case involving a contract to supply and install carpeting the
N.Y.S.2d 165, 169, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 953-54 (1972) (court noting new
statute).
21. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1977).
22. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
23. See Anderson, Pitfalls for Sellers and Buyers Under the Market Formula of Section 2-
708, 4 REV. LITIGATION 251, 258-65 (1985).
24. See U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b) (1977).
25. Some history indicates that the drafters of the Code contemplated the lost volume
seller situation when they drafted § 2-708(2). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at
274-75.
26. Cases allowing the lost volume seller access to the profit formula under § 2-708(2)
include: Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1669 (1st Cir. 1982); Blair Int'l, Ltd. v. LaBarge, Inc., 675 F.2d 954, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
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court went so far as to hold that the seller was entitled to the profit formula
even if the breach did not cause the seller to lose any volume in its sales.
27
The court set forth two alternative reasons why section 2-708(2) provided
the appropriate damage measurement. The first related to the seller's vol-
ume situation. The court said that the seller might be considered a single
lost volume seller. 28 The court agreed with the seller's position that, regard-
less whether the buyer breached the purchase contract, the seller could have
sold carpet to the final resale purchasers of the carpet that was the subject of
the breached contract. 29 Because of the breach, therefore, the seller made
only one sale, the resale, instead of two, and thus lost the entire profit from
the breached sale. 30 As an alternative to the lost volume rationale the court
held that the seller was entitled to recover lost profit under section 2-708(2)
because of the mixed nature of the breached contract. 31 The court reasoned
that, since the contract was for both a goods sale and installation service, a
recovery under the market formula based on the market price for the goods
would not compensate the seller for the profit it would have made on the
service aspect of the contract. 32
The court's analysis allowing profit formula recovery because of the mixed
nature of the contract is flawed. No reason exists why, for purposes of
achieving compensation and avoiding windfalls as mandated by section 1-
106,33 the court could not have bifurcated the damage recovery for the
(Callaghan) 1242 (8th Cir. 1982); TCP Indus. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 32 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 369 (6th Cir. 1981); Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212,
28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1039 (5th Cir. 1980); Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair,
Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 415 (4th Cir. 1974); Great W. Sugar Co.
v. Mrs. Allison's Cookie Co., 563 F. Supp. 430, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 164 (E.D.
Mo. 1983); Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp.
846, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 406 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979);
Comeq, Inc. v. Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc., 456 So. 2d 264, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 488 (Ala. 1984); Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 61 (Ala. 1979); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., 144 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330,
39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802 (Ct. App. 1984); Capital Steel Co. v. Foster & Creighton
Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574 S.W.2d 256, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1349 (1978); Distribu-
Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 36 (1970); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d
618, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1104 (1977); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d
393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950 (1972); Kaiser-
man v. Martin J. Ain, Ltd., 112 Misc. 2d 768, 450 N.Y.S.2d 135, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1374 (N.Y. App. Term. 1981); see also Schiavi Mobil Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d
722, 725-26, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1190, 1194-95 (Me. 1983) (failure to mitigate
damages prevents access to profit formula); Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio
App. 3d 55, 463 N.E.2d 70, 72-73, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 845, 848-49 (1983) (evi-
dence insufficient for lost volume status).
27. Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618, 625,
22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1104, 1113 (1977).
28. 380 A.2d at 624, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1112.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 625, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1113.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Coast Indus. v. Noonan, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 333, 231 A.2d 663, 665-66, 4
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 582, 583-84 (1966) (applying § 2-708(2) by analogy to construc-
tion service contract).
33. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977).
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goods and services aspects of the contract. 34 Thus, if the seller was not left
at lost volume, but rather was able to resell the carpet to a buyer to whom it
could not have sold but for the breach, the amount received from the resale
should have mitigated the damages owed by the buyer. The cases so hold.3"
As noted earlier, a well-recognized example of the lost volume seller is the
so-called jobber or middleman. So long as the available source of supply of a
jobber or middleman exceeds the purchases made by customers, a breach by
any of the customers will obviously leave this type of seller in a lost volume
situation. Professors Summers and White misleadingly state the conditions
necessary for a jobber or middleman to recover on the basis of the Code's
profit formula. They suggest that such a seller must meet the two conditions
of having never acquired the contract goods and of having been commer-
cially reasonable in deciding not to acquire them.36 Actually, whether the
jobber or middleman has acquired the goods makes no difference. What is
important is whether the jobber or middleman has available to it through its
sources of supply more goods than it can sell. If at the time of the buyer's
breach the seller has ordered and received the buyer's goods and is able to
resell the goods to another, it does not lose its status as a lost volume seller
so long as it can show that it could have made both the sale to the breaching
buyer and the resale.
Professors Summers and White are certainly correct that to recover under
section 2-708(2) the jobber or middleman must act in a commercially reason-
able manner with respect to a decision not to acquire the goods. Commer-
cial reasonableness should be judged in terms of whether or not the seller
could have mitigated damages by acquiring the goods and reselling them.
Mitigation would be possible in cases in which the demand of the seller's
customers for the goods exceeds the seller's supply, or in cases in which the
seller, by acquiring the goods, would be able to resell goods to a buyer to
whom the seller could not have sold but for the breach.
The reported decisions consistently have recognized the jobber or middle-
man as a lost volume seller and have allowed the seller access to the profit
formula of section 2-708(2).37 If such a seller can mitigate damages by ac-
quiring the goods and reselling them, however, the indications are that
courts will require the seller to do so or suffer the consequence of being
denied recovery for any damages that could have been mitigated. Thus, in
34. For a case applying different damage measures to the goods and nongoods aspects of a
contract, see Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222, 226-27, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 446, 448-49 (10th Cir. 1967).
35. Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 1081-82, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1979); Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722,
725-26, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1190, 1194-95 (Me. 1983). See generally Anderson,
Plunging the Depths, supra note 11, at 482-86 (resale mandatory when it results in mitigation
of damages).
36. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 278.
37. See Blair Int'l, Ltd. v. LaBarge, Inc., 675 F.2d 954, 960, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1242, 1250 (8th Cir. 1982); Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212,
215, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1039, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980); Distribu-Dor, Inc. v.




one case the breaching buyer argued that the jobber's contract with its
source of supply restricted the sale of the contract goods solely to the
breaching buyer. The breaching buyer further argued, however, that the
jobber was free to sell to other purchasers goods previously ordered and that
its failure to mitigate damages by doing so was unreasonable. The court
found the evidence equivocal and upheld the decision of the trial court in
favor of the jobber on this "close question." '38
In a clearer decision on point the seller was a retailer of mobile homes.
The buyer breached, but later produced a substitute buyer, his father, who
was willing and able to purchase the goods for the full contract price. In
remanding the case, the court held that the seller should not receive any
profit formula or resale formula recovery that could have been avoided by
selling the goods to the substitute buyer.39
Both these cases illustrate an important point to the present discussion
that a seller may be a lost volume seller generally, but not occupy such a
status under the particular facts of the case being tried. If the seller resells
the goods to one who would not have purchased from the seller except for
the buyer's breach, or if the seller fails to mitigate damages by making a sale
to such a substitute buyer, the seller has not lost, or should not have lost,
volume as a result of the buyer's breach. Thus, the seller will not be allowed
to measure its loss based on the profit formula of section 2-708(2).
B. The Full Capacity Seller; Mitigation of Damages
If goods are in completed form at the time of a buyer's breach, the seller
may or may not be left in a lost volume situation. For present purposes, a
seller who does not lose volume as a result of a breach will be referred to as a
full capacity seller. If the goods can be resold, a full capacity seller has more
customers than it can supply. The breach enables such a seller immediately
to reenter the market and resell the goods. Assuming the seller has followed
the basic requirements of section 2-706, the seller may then recover against
the breaching buyer damages based on the Code's resale formula. Of course,
if buyer demand exceeds the available supply, the resale formula will not
likely allow any damage recovery because the resale price will probably
equal or exceed the price of the breached contract. Further, since the goods
can be resold, the seller would not be entitled to an action for the price.4°
What happens if, rather than reselling the goods, the seller decides to hold
them past the time for a commercially reasonable resale and comes into
court requesting damages based on section 2-708? Although the question is
arguable, there is no suggestion in the Code that the seller should not be
allowed recovery under the market formula of section 2-708(1). The situa-
tion can be analyzed as if the seller itself purchased the contract goods at
38. TCP Indus. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 551-52, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
369, 382 (6th Cir. 1981).
39. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 725-26, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1190, 1194-95 (Me. 1983).
40. See U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b) (1977).
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their market value at the time and place for tender. The market value
purchase price, in effect, mitigates the damages owed by the breaching
buyer. Furthermore, little, if any, damages will result from the application
of the market formula because, with demand exceeding supply, the market
price will be close to, if not in excess of, the price of the breached contract.
May a full capacity seller who has not resold the goods recover damages
for lost profit under section 2-708(2)? Professors Summers and White have
suggested that such a seller may recover, at least if the seller can show that
the market formula is inadequate to compensate for the loss. 4 1 Assume a
seller contracts to sell goods for $10,000 and that direct costs in the goods
are $6,500. The seller thus anticipates a profit, including reasonable over-
head, of $3,500. The buyer breaches, and the market price at the time and
place for tender is $8,000. If the seller is operating at full capacity, the
seller's compensatory damages, ignoring incidental damages, are $2,000.
The seller can recoup the remainder of the expected profit by reselling the
goods at the market price of $8,000.
On these facts, both the market formula of section 2-708(1) and the resale
formula of section 2-706 will produce the identical $2,000 recovery. If the
seller actually resells the goods for less than the $8,000, section 2-706, of
course, will allow the greater recovery. Assume, however, that the seller
does not resell, but holds the goods until trial when their market value has
declined to $7,000. The seller argues that the profit lost as a result of the
breach is $3,500 and that the court should allow recovery of this amount
under section 2-708(2) because, with the goods now being worth only
$7,000, the market formula does not restore the seller to the position it
would have occupied had the buyer performed. 42 The market formula will
only allow the $2,000 recovery, the difference between the market price at
the time for tender and the contract price.
Professors Summers and White would grant the seller the profit recovery
and dismiss as unrealistic any concerns that this result would encourage sell-
ers to forego resale and speculate on a higher recovery under the profit
formula. 43 Their conclusion may or may not be true, but it misses the point.
The seller's position is specious, not because the seller acted insidiously, but
because it acted unreasonably by failing to mitigate damages. After the
buyer's breach a ready resale market was available, and the seller could have
resold the goods for approximately $8,000, producing compensatory dam-
ages of $2,000.
The cases to date that have considered to any extent this bizarre situation
indicate that an affirmative duty does fall upon full capacity sellers to resell
the contract goods following breach or be denied any damages that could
thereby have been avoided. It is, after all, purely the seller's fault that it
41. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 279-81.
42. See U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1977) (profit formula available only if market formula
inadequate).
43. "[W]e suspect this is not the way people in business behave." J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 5, at 281.
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comes to trial not having resold the goods and in a position in which only
the profit formula of section 2-708(2) will make it whole. For example, in
one case the plaintiffs, wheat farmers, contracted to sell their entire crop to
the defendant. The defendant breached because of a shortage of railroad
cars to ship the wheat to market. The sellers were obviously in a full capac-
ity situation, having agreed to sell their entire crop to the defendant. The
court denied recovery of any damages to the sellers, noting that the market
price at the time of breach was roughly double that of the contract price and
that the sellers should simply have resold their wheat. 44 One wonders why
the goods were not resold. Real people generally do not act as the plaintiffs
did, especially when the resale market has doubled. Possibly, the goods were
not truly resalable, but, if they were not resalable, the sellers simply failed in
their burden of proof with respect to a price action under section 2-709.45 In
no event on the facts of the case should recovery have been based on the
profit formula.
The basic proposition is that the seller will be obligated to mitigate dam-
ages by a reasonable resale when possible.46 An excellent case on point,
discussed earlier, involved a seller who was a retailer of mobile homes. Such
retailers are usually lost volume sellers. Because of various personal difficul-
ties the buyers of one of the seller's mobile homes breached the contract.
The father of one of the buyers, however, immediately came forward and
made a firm and reasonable offer to purchase the mobile home so that his
son would not lose the deposit that had been paid. The facts clearly estab-
lished that the father would not have otherwise offered to purchase the
home. Again evidencing the fact that real people sometimes act unrealisti-
cally, the seller refused the father's offer and resold the home to a third
party. The seller then sought to add insult to injury by seeking recovery
against the breaching buyers for the lost profit under section 2-708(2). The
seller argued that it was a lost volume seller entitled to a recovery on the
basis of the profit formula. The court noted the long-standing rule of con-
tract law that an aggrieved party has an affirmative duty to mitigate damages
and that this common law duty survives under the Code. 47 The court then
held that because the plaintiff refused to sell to the father, it could not assert
that it had lost profits on the sale to the third party. 4
The court correctly decided the case. Furthermore, the holding is consis-
tent with the mandate of section 1-106 that the Code's remedies be liberally
44. Desbien v. Penokee Farmers Union Ass'n, 220 Kan. 358, 552 P.2d 917, 927, 20
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 102, 109 (1976); see also Zippy Mart of Alabama, Inc. v. A & B
Coffee Serv., Inc., 380 So. 2d 833, 835, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 396, 398 (Ala. 1980)
(in computing damages for lost profit court must determine whether seller could have miti-
gated damages by reselling goods).
45. See U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b) (1977) (after buyer's breach seller may recover price of con-
tract goods if reasonable effort to resell goods fails or if circumstances indicate resale attempt
would be unavailing).
46. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 726-27, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.





administered to the end of achieving compensation, no more and no less.49
The case also well demonstrates the proposition that lost volume is a partic-
ular rather than a general concept. Regardless of a seller's general situation,
it is not left at lost volume if a particular buyer's breach allows it to make a
reasonable resale that it could not have made but for the breach. Whether a
particular breach leaves the seller at lost volume is often a close question,
and a jury finding thereon will not be lightly 4isturbed. 50
Of course, if a full capacity seller does act realistically and actually resells
the goods, all would agree that the seller's recovery must be based on the
resale formula and not on section 2-708(2). 51 One case has even held that a
full capacity seller who conducts a commercially unreasonable resale, so that
the resale formula of section 2-706 cannot properly be used, will only re-
cover damages computed on the difference between the contract price and
the amount that would have been received from a commercially reasonable
resale.5 2 Thus, the common law concept of mitigation of damages is very
much alive under the Uniform Commercial Code.
C. Incomplete Goods; Component Sellers
If a buyer breaches prior to the time the seller has begun manufacture of
the goods under contract, or after the seller has begun manufacture but
before completion, and the seller reasonably decides not to complete manu-
facture of the goods, 53 the seller may base an action for damages on the
profit formula of section 2-708(2). This rule results in part from a process of
elimination. The price action is not available since the seller has not com-
pleted the goods and thus cannot tender them to the breaching buyer. 4 The
resale remedy is not available because the seller does not have any completed
goods to resell. The market formula of section 2-708(1) is also not available
because the formula contemplates an actual resale of completed goods. 55
Only the profit formula of section 2-708(2) remains as a compensatory rem-
edy for the seller.5 6
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the inadequacy of the market formula
49. See U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977).
50. TCP Indus. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 552, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
369, 382 (6th Cir. 1981).
51. See Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 56, 463 N.E.2d 70, 72,
38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 845, 847 (1983).
52. Coast Trading Co. v. Cudahy Co., 592 F.2d 1074, 1083, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 1978).
53. Section 2-704 allows a seller to discontinue the manufacture of goods following a
buyer's breach if the seller acts "in the exercise of reasonable commercial judgment for the
purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization . U.C.C. § 2-704 (1977).
54. See id. § 2-709(2).
55. See Anderson, supra note 23, at 259-61.
56. Although other classes of aggrieved sellers may also be entitled to measure
their damages in accordance with ... [§ 2-708(2)], it is enough for this case to
note that a seller of uncompleted components whose market is composed solely
of the buyer in breach cannot adequately measure his damages in any other way.
Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prod., Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 439 A.2d 314, 320, 31 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 91, 99 (1981).
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and the appropriateness of the profit formula to compensate an incomplete
goods or components seller. 57 Assume that the contract price is $10,000,
that the market price at the time and place for tender is $7,500, that the
direct costs of manufacturing the goods would have been $9,000, and that at
the time of the breach the seller has incurred $6,000 in partially manufactur-
ing the goods. Assume further that the seller properly decides to discontinue
manufacturing the goods, thereby saving costs of $3,000, and that the seller
is able to sell the partially manufactured goods as components or scrap for
$5,000. On these facts the seller has suffered damages of $2,000: a lost profit
of $1,000 and unrecouped costs of $1,000. The original Restatement of Con-
tracts would allow the $2,000 recovery under alternative formulas of the
contract price ($10,000) less expenses saved ($3,000 plus $5,000), or by the
profit lost ($1,000) plus the unrecouped expenses incurred ($1,000).", The
market formula of section 2-708(1) will not approach the $2,000 level of
compensation and, indeed, would provide for a negative recovery. The
formula would allow for the contract/market differential of $2,500, but re-
quire a deduction of $3,000 for expenses avoided because of the buyer's
breach.5 9 The market formula was never intended to apply to incomplete
goods cases. 60
Section 2-708(2) not only provides for the compensatory $2,000 recovery,
it reads as though it were specifically designed for the incomplete goods case.
The provision states:
[T]he measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead)
which the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer
[$1,000], together with any incidential damages provided in this Article
(Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred [$6,000]
and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale [$5,000].61
Another reason for the appropriateness of the profit formula in incomplete
goods cases is that such cases are another example of the lost volume situa-
tion. According to Professors Summers and White, when a breach occurs
before completion of manufacture and the seller chooses not to complete
manufacture, the seller has lost the volume of one sale since the sale of the
completed goods will never happen.62 Of course, even assuming the seller
properly discontinued manufacture of the contract goods, the seller retains
57. A components seller is a seller obligated to assemble the contract goods from compo-
nent parts. This terminology was first used in Harris, Sales Act Results, supra note 7, at 68-72,
97-98. A components seller is indistinguishable for present purposes from other types of
manufacturers.
58. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 346 comment h (1932). This provision refers to
service contracts. Nevertheless, one who agrees to construct a house is in no different a dam-
age position following breach than one who agrees to construct goods if the breach occurs
prior to the time the housing or goods have been completed.
59. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1977).
60. Incomplete goods have no value in the market that is contemplated by the market
price term of § 2-708(1). See cases cited infra note 97.
61. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1977).
62. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 276; see Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer In-




an obligation to mitigate damages if reasonably possible. If by discontinuing
manufacture, for example, the seller's production facilities are freed up so
that the seller may reasonable enter into other contracts, any profits that the
seller could earn thereby should mitigate the damages owed by the breaching
buyer.
To borrow from the facts of a well known pre-Code case, assume that a
seller agreed to supply a buyer's requirements of pulp for one year, that the
requirements absorbed ten percent of the seller's production capacity, and
that, following the buyer's breach by refusal to take further pulp, the seller's
production dropped from 100% to 90% of capacity. Applying the Uniform
Sales Act 63 to these facts the court held that the market formula was inappli-
cable because it applied only in the case of completed goods.64 The court
then allowed the seller to recover damages based on the lost profit plus rea-
sonable overhead.6 5 The decision was correct, and the same result occurs
under the Code unless the facts would show that, subsequent to the breach,
the seller is reasonably able to move its production capacity back above the
ninety percent level. If the seller actually does so, any profits generated
thereby should offset or mitigate the seller's damage recovery. 66 If the seller
unreasonably fails so to mitigate damages, it should not recover for any
amount of loss that it could have avoided. 67
In sum, section 2-708(2) is the only appropriate damage formula for in-
complete goods sellers. Although an occasional early decision under the
Code held the contrary, 68 the recent decisions of the courts consistently con-
sider the profit formula the appropriate recovery device. 69 The appropriate-
63. UNIF. SALES ACT § 64(4) (1906).
64. Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 A. 519, 524 (1929).
65. Id.
66. See Zippy Mart of Alabama, Inc. v. A & B Coffee Serv., Inc., 380 So. 2d 833, 835, 28
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 396, 398 (Ala. 1980).
67. See Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 726, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1190, 1196 (Me. 1983).
68. Detroit Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25 Mich. App. 478, 181 N.W.2d 828, 833,
8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 504, 509 (1970); Jagger Brothers, Inc. v. Technical Textile
Co., 202 Pa. Super. 639, 198 A.2d 888, 890, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 97, 99 (1964).
69. Unique Sys., Inc. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 373, 378, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1340, 1348 (8th Cir. 1980); City of Louisville v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159, 165,
12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 840, 847 (6th Cir. 1973); Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI
B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846, 854, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
406, 414 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979); American Metal Climax, Inc. v.
Essex Int'l, Inc., 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 101, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Holiday Mfg.
Co. v. B.A.S.F. Sys., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1096, 1105, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 820, 828
(D. Neb. 1974); Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co., 646 P.2d 229, 236-37, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1678, 1682-83 (Alaska 1982); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., 144 Ariz. 181,
696 P.2d 1330, 1339-40, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv, (Callaghan) 802, 814-15 (Ct. App. 1984); Capi-
tal Steel Co. v. Foster & Creighton Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574 S.W.2d 256, 259, 25 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1349, 1353 (1978); Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prods., Inc., 183 Conn.
266, 439 A.2d 314, 320, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv, (Callaghan) 91, 99 (1981); Cesco Mfg. Corp. v.
Norcross, Inc., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 837, 391 N.E.2d 270, 273, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
126, 129 (1979); E-Z Roll Hardware Mfg. Co. v. H & H Prods. & Finishing Corp., 4 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1045, 1047-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); Paramount Lithographic Plate
Serv., Inc. v. Hughes Printing Co., 2 Pa. D. & C. 3d 677, 694, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1129, 1139-40 (Ct. C.P.), aff'd mem., 249 Pa. Super. 625, 377 A.2d 1001 (1977); Coast
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ness of the profit formula assumes that the seller's decision to discontinue
manufacture of the goods was reasonable. What if the buyer can show that
the seller could have reasonably mitigated damages by completing the goods
and reselling them? The next section considers this question.
D. Completion of Goods Unfinished at Breach
An incomplete or component goods seller, as such, should be entitled to
the profit formula of section 2-708(2) only if its decision not to complete
manufacture was commercially reasonable. In other words, if the seller
could have mitigated damages by completing and reselling the goods, dam-
age recovery should be reduced by the amount of the loss that completion
and resale would have avoided. Damages would be measured on the basis of
what the seller's recovery would properly have been had it completed the
goods. If after completion the seller would have been in a full capacity situa-
tion, it should recover no more than the difference between the price of the
breached contract and the amount that would have been brought by a rea-
sonable resale of the completed goods, this latter figure roughly equalling the
market price of the completed goods as provided by section 2-708(1). If
following completion the seller would have been in a lost volume situation,
the seller would still properly recover for lost profit under section 2-708(2),
but no recovery should be allowed under the formula for "costs reasonably
incurred"7 0 if the seller could reasonably have recouped these costs by com-
pleting and reselling the goods.
Section 2-704(2) establishes the mitigation of damages requirement for
sellers who have not completed assembly or manufacture of goods at the
time of a buyer's breach. It provides:
Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller may in the exercise
of reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss
and of effective realization either complete the manufacture and wholly
identify the goods to the contract or cease manufacture and resell for
scrap or salvage value or proceed in any other reasonable manner.7'
The requirement of "avoiding loss" is clear, but the Code does not explain
the meaning of "effective realization." If realization refers to the seller's lost
expectation on the breached contract, the meaning is probably that the seller
need only act reasonably and that in mitigating the loss it may look to its
own interests as well as those of the breaching buyer. Professors Summers
and White support this interpretation.
Suppose the client says the damages on this contract will probably be
enhanced by completing, but that he simply cannot afford to cease man-
ufacture, lay off all his skilled employees, and thus lose many of them to
other employers. Surely such a seller is making an intelligent and com-
mercially reasonable judgment to complete even though in the narrow
context of one contract he is increasing the damages to this particular
Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 1079, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1047, 1054-55 (1978).
70. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1977).
71. Id. § 2-704(2).
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buyer. In such circumstances we should permit the seller to complete
and should not find his action commercially unreasonable. 72
Thus in one case, after a government buyer breached by nonpayment, the
seller continued making deliveries of helium. The court held that the seller's
continuing delivery was commercially reasonable because the manufacture
of helium was necessary to the seller's other operations and because the
seller had no storage facilities for the helium nor any buyer for it other than
the government. 7
3
Comment 2 to section 2-704 explains that the seller is obligated only to
exercise reasonable commercial judgment.74 The seller's decision should be
assessed in light of the facts as they appear at the time the seller learns of the
buyer's breach or, presumably, at a commercially reasonable time thereafter
when the seller actually makes the decision. 7" Furthermore, the breaching
buyer has the burden of proving the seller's unreasonableness in minimizing
lOSS. 7 6
The comment refers only to a seller's decision whether to complete the
goods. 77 The provision should hold with equal force to a seller's decision to
discontinue manufacture or assembly. 78  This distinction is important be-
cause seldom does a merchant seller actually pull goods off the line and dis-
continue manufacture. In practice discontinuing manufacture, rather than
completing the goods, is the course of conduct that would normally raise
suspicion. Most sellers sell standardized goods that have a ready market and
can be resold. This is true even for sellers who manufacture only to particu-
lar or special order by their customers. As is addressed below, if the goods
can be resold at a reasonable price, the seller should complete manufacture,
and in real world situations it usually does. Only if the goods apparently
have no reasonable resale market, as in the case of goods manufactured to a
buyer's unique requirements or fad goods for which the market has deterio-
rated, should the seller discontinue manufacture. Professors Summers and
72. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 290; see also Harris, Sales Act Results,
supra note 7, at 72 (court should find for seller that stops production and seeks to recover
components' value unless seller knew decision would enhance damages and completion of pro-
duction would not have unreasonably harmed seller's interests).
73. Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 118, 132, 455 F.2d 546, 554, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 353, 363-64 (1972) (question of liability); see also O'Hare v.
Peacock Dairies, Inc., 26 Cal. App. 2d 345, 79 P.2d 433, 439 (1938) (continued delivery of
milk reasonable since no commercially effective way existed to cease production by herd). The
question of damages in Northern Helex was decided at 207 Ct. Cl. 862, 888-90, 524 F.2d 707,
721-22 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 866 (1976).
74. Under this Article the seller is given express power to complete manufacture
or procurement of goods for the contract unless the exercise of reasonable com-
mercial judgment as to the facts as they appear at the time he learns of the
breach makes it clear that such action will result in a material increase in dam-
ages. The burden is on the buyer to show the commercially unreasonable nature
of the seller's action in completing manufacture.




78. 3 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 13, § 2-704.02, at 276; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 5, at 291.
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White suggest the following starting point for making an intelligent choice
under section 2-704.
Therefore, the first question which the lawyer should ask himself is
what damages the seller may recover from the buyer if he ceases manu-
facturing at once and sues under 2-708(2) for his lost profit. Next, how
do those damages compare with the damages the seller is likely to re-
cover under 2-706 upon completion of the manufacture and the resale
of the goods? To make these decisions correctly, one must make not
only accurate legal analyses but also careful empirical judgments about
the current and future market and about the seller's lost profit. One
certainly should preserve all evidence which formed the bases for the
decision and should document by letter or written memo when and why
the decision to complete or not to complete was made.
79
All of this analysis rests on the proposition that, assuming the breach has
left the seller at lost volume, the formula in section 2-708(2) allows the seller
to recover its lost profit regardless whether it discontinues manufacture. If
the seller discontinues manufacture, however, the formula allows an addi-
tional recovery of those costs in part performance that cannot be recouped.
In any case in which the seller reasonably anticipates that it can resell the
goods for an amount at least equal to the direct costs of manufacture, the
decision to complete manufacture should be found reasonable because the
seller meant to save the buyer the costs of part performance that had been
incurred at the time of the breach. Even if the seller cannot recoup the costs
incurred at the time of the breach by scrapping the goods, the seller can still
mitigate its loss if it can resell the completed goods at a price in excess of the
cost of completion. To return to the earlier hypothetical, at the time of the
breach the seller had incurred $6,000 of $9,000 total direct costs. The con-
tract price was $10,000, and the seller would have made a profit of $1,000,
including reasonable overhead. If the seller discontinued manufacture, dam-
ages under section 2-708(2) would be $7,000 (profit of $1,000 plus costs rea-
sonably incurred of $6,000). If the seller completes manufacture of the
goods and can resell them for $4,000, a price in excess of the $3,000 cost of
completion, damages under section 2-708(2) would be only $6,000 (a profit
of $1,000 plus $9,000 costs reasonably incurred less $4,000 proceeds of
resale). 80
The picture at the time of breach is complicated by the fact that the in-
complete goods will usually have some value, and their resale, if only as
scrap, will recoup some of the seller's loss. In such situations a seller acts
reasonably by completing manufacture only if the seller anticipates resale of
the goods at a price at least equal to the costs of completion plus the scrap
value of the partially manufactured goods. Thus, in the hypothetical, if the
seller can scrap the partially manufactured goods for $5,000, damage recov-
79. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 290.
80. Although courts and commentators agree that the language in § 2-708(2) referring to
due credit for resale proceeds was intended to refer solely to the resale of partially manufac-
tured goods following a discontinuance of their production, the provision clearly should apply
to complete goods in this situation. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
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ery under section 2-708(2) would total only $2,000 ($1,000 profit plus $6,000
costs reasonably incurred less $5,000 resale proceeds). The seller can miti-
gate these damages only by completing and reselling the goods at a price in
excess of $8,000 (the $3,000 cost to complete plus the $5,000 scrap value).8
Presumably section 2-704, which allows a seller either to complete or
scrap contract goods in order to mitigate damages, applies both to a seller
who has not begun manufacture, as well as to one who has. A narrow inter-
pretation of the term "unfinished" 8 2 cuts against this interpretation, but the
underlying concept of the provision would make illogical a distinction be-
tween partially manufactured goods and those for which manufacture has
not begun. Of course, the decisions that a seller must make under section 2-
704(2) when manufacture has not yet begun will usually be much easier than
the same decisions in situations in which the seller has incurred costs in
partially manufacturing the goods.
In practice a seller's section 2-704(2) decisions are quite speculative and
dependent both on the anticipated resale market for the completed goods
and on how much of the expenses incurred in part performance the seller
can recoup by discontinuing manufacture and scrapping the goods. The
burden of proof that the seller acted unreasonably is on the buyer, and such
a burden is not an easy one to carry.83 The cases to date indicate that courts
will generally uphold a seller's decision to discontinue manufacture follow-
ing a buyer's breach absent clear proof of unreasonableness.8 4 That the
courts will uphold the decision is true especially when it appears questiona-
ble that a viable resale market existed for the goods.8 5 In addition, the
seller's decision is judged at the time it was reasonably made; hindsight that
may prove the decision erroneous is immaterial,8 6 even if the decision dra-
matically exacerbates damages. Thus, in one case, the seller completed man-
ufacture of the goods in reasonable anticipation of reselling them, only to
81. Of course, this analysis assumes that the seller cannot better use its production capac-
ity in performing other contracts rather than completing manufacture of the goods involved in
the breached contract.
82. U.C.C. § 2-704(2) (1977).
83. Id. comment 2; see Modem Mach. v. Flathead County, 202 Mont. 140, 656 P.2d 206,
211, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 395, 401 (1982).
84. See Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prods., Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 439 A.2d 314, 320, 31
U.CC. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 91, 99-100 (1981); Modem Mach. v. Flathead County, 202
Mont. 140, 656 P.2d 206, 211, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 395, 401 (1982); E-Z Roll
Hardware Mfg. Co. v. H & H Prods. & Finishing Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1045, 1048 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); Timber Access Indus. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers,
Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503 P.2d 482, 489-90, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 994, 996 (1972);
Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 1078-79, 25 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1047, 1055-56 (1978).
85. See Timber Access Indus. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503
P.2d 482, 489-90, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 994, 996 (1972); Coast Trading Co. v.
Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 1078, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1047, 1055 (1978).
86. The Code makes this position clear in U.C.C. § 2-704 comment 2 (1977). This ap-
proach is a departure from pre-Code law under the UNIF. SALES ACT § 64(4) (1906), which
provided that a seller that guessed wrong and actually increased damages by completing manu-
facture bore the entire risk of that increase and could recover no greater damages than if it had
discontinued the manufacture. See 3 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 13, § 2-704:02, at 275-76.
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find that the market had dissolved and only a portion of the goods could be
resold. The court properly allowed the seller the full unpaid contract price
under section 2-709 for the unsold goods.87
E. Other Cases; No Existing Market
Professors Summers and White suggest that a multitude of cases, other
than those involving lost volume sellers of completed goods and incomplete
or component goods sellers, may be subject to the profit formula of section 2-
708(2). 88 The suggestion is wrong and, as noted by one commentator, no
court has applied the provision to any such cases. 89 Summers and White
specify two categorical examples. 90 The first involves a seller who resells the
completed goods, but is unable to prove that lost volume resulted from the
breach.9 1 Although this situation is discussed more fully below,92 its resolu-
tion should be that the seller must carry the burden of proof of its entitle-
ment to damages, and failure to do so will restrict recovery. Much of the
history of damage law is the story of aggrieved plaintiffs suffering from a
similar plight. 93 The second situation involves a full capacity seller who,
rather than reselling the goods, holds them past the time for a commercially
reasonable resale. 94 Although the two scholars suggest that such a seller
should receive a section 2-708(2) recovery, this Article has already con-
cluded the contrary. 95
The profit formula should be available in only two categories of cases.
First, the profit formula should be available to all component or incomplete
goods sellers who have acted reasonably in not completing the goods. The
second category consists of sellers of completed goods who are able to
demonstrate that the buyer's breach caused lost volume.
A number of Code cases allow an aggrieved seller access to the profit
formula upon a finding that no market exists for the goods. At first blush
these holdings might indicate yet another category for the application of sec-
tion 2-708(2). An examination of the facts in the cases and the analyses by
the courts, however, shows that all of the cases involve situations of lost
volume or incomplete goods. The courts often hold that, if the seller is a
87. Foxco Indus. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976, 983, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1979).
88. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 278.
89. G. WALLACH, supra note 13, at 8-17.
90. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 279.
91. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notesl78-209.
93. See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1216 (1970) ("All in all, our system of legal remedies for breach of contract, heavily influenced
by the economic philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a marked solicitude for men who do
not keep their promises."); Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovery of Overhead Under UCC Section
2-708(2): Economic Cost Theory and Contract Remedial Policy, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 681,
683-87 (1972) (since contract damages are compensatory rather than punitive, plaintiff must
bear burden of showing actual damages).
94. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 279.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 41-52 (courts should continue to impose on plain-
tiffs duty to mitigate damages by prompt resale).
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middleman or jobber who never takes possession of the goods, the seller has
no available market in which to sell the goods.96 In the same vein, the
courts often hold that no market is available for a seller when the seller has
not completed the goods.97 The results in all of these cases are correct, but
not solely for the reason given. In today's economy rare indeed is a situation
in which absolutely no market exists for particular goods. Virtually every-
thing can be resold at some price. Furthermore, the Code itself provides
great flexibility for proving some value for use as the market price under
section 2-708(1).98 Thus, although there is a certain logic to the reasoning
that the market formula, in situations in which market price cannot be
shown, does not adequately compensate the seller as required by section 2-
708(2), 99 such cases will actually occur quite infrequently. When the cases
do come up, when the goods cannot be resold at a reasonable price, the seller
should proceed, not under the profit formula, but for the full unpaid contract
price under section 2-709.
F When the Market Formula Provides a Windfall
In order to base a recovery on the profit formula, section 2-708(2) requires
that the seller prove that the market formula will not provide adequate com-
pensation. On the other hand, the Code does not prohibit a seller's using the
market formula instead of section 2-708(2) to recover less than compensa-
tory damages. Is the converse proposition true? Must an aggrieved seller
use the profit formula if the market formula would provide the seller a wind-
fall by placing it in a better position than it would have occupied had the
buyer performed the contract?
This problem can arise quite easily in any case in which the market value
of the contract goods has declined dramatically subsequent to contracting.
In the hypothetical considered above, the seller suffered $2,000 in actual
damages when it properly discontinued manufacturing the goods. It suffered
a lost profit, including reasonable overhead, of $1,000 and another $1,000 in
unrecouped costs when it salvaged the goods for only $5,000 after having
incurred $6,000 of manufacturing costs. The market price at the time and
96. See Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 215, 28 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1039, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980); Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d
272, 275-76, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 61, 66 (Ala. 1979); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer
Indus., 141 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330, 1340, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802, 815 (Ct.
App. 1984).
97. See Unique Sys., Inc. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 373, 378, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1340, 1348 (8th Cir. 1980); Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co., 646 P.2d 229, 236, 33
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1678, 1682-83 (Alaska 1982); Cesco Mfg. Corp. v. Norcross,
Inc., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 837, 391 N.E.2d 270, 275, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 126, 131-
32 (1979); Timber Access Indus. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503
P.2d 482, 489, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 994, 996 (1972); see also Anchorage Centen-
nial Dev. Co. v. Van Wormer & Rodrigues, Inc., 443 P.2d 596, 599, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 811, 813 (Alaska 1968) (no market for made-to-order coins); Detroit Power
Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25 Mich. App. 478, 181 N.W.2d 828, 832-33, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 504, 509 (1970) (no market for specialty item).
98. See Anderson, supra note 23, at 277-80, 283-86.
99. See U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1977) (profit formula applies when market formula "inade-
quate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done").
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place for tender, however, was $7,500. Might the seller base its recovery on
section 2-708(1) and recover the difference between the contract price and
market price, $2,500, thereby receiving a windfall of $500? As discussed in
the preceding section of this Article, the courts will probably avoid this
problem by denying the seller access to the market formula if the goods are
incomplete and the seller is not in a position to tender them.1°°
If the goods have been completed, a more difficult situation arises since a
true resale market exists for the completed goods. In the hypothetical if the
seller is at lost volume, the actual economic loss is the profit, including rea-
sonable overhead, of $1,000. The market formula would produce a recovery
of $2,500. The seller might make the plausible argument that it should re-
ceive the greater recovery because nothing in the text of section 2-708(1)
restricts use of the market formula and nothing in section 2-708(2) requires
the seller to base its damages on the profit formula. In Nobs Chemical,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co.10 1 the Fifth Circuit found the argument intrigu-
ing, but nevertheless limited the seller's recovery to damages under section
2-708(2).102 The seller was a jobber or middleman who had never acquired
the goods from its source of supply and thus clearly was left in a lost volume
situation by the buyer's breach. The trial court had limited the seller's re-
covery to $95,000 based on lost profits for the contract goods under section
2-708(2).103 On appeal the seller sought to recover damages based on the
market formula, which would have produced a recovery of between
$275,520 and $319,600. The seller argued that the court should consider
section 2-708(1) as a statutory liquidated damage provision accorded sellers
as a matter of right. In affirming the judgment of the trial court and re-
jecting the arguments of the seller, the court pointed to section 1-106 of the
Code, which directs that damage recoveries provide compensation and that
windfall and penal damages be avoided. '04 The court also relied heavily on
the commentary of Professors Summers and White, who had anticipated the
problem before it arose in any reported decision.105
Summers and White have concluded that the burden should be on the
buyer to prove that the market formula will indeed provide a windfall recov-
ery. They say:
We argue that the defendant is entitled to restrict the plaintiff to 2-
708(2) only when defendant can prove that the measure of damages in
2-708(1) will overcompensate the plaintiff. We well understand that we
100. See Capital Steel Co. v. Foster & Creighton Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574 S.W.2d 256, 258,
25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1349, 1352 (1978); cf supra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text (when goods are incomplete courts allow seller access to profit formula, saying no market
exists for incomplete goods). Furthermore, the seller faces the risk that, should it be allowed
access to the market formula, the court will put it in a worse position by making a deduction
for expenses saved by not completing manufacture or assembly of the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-
708(1) (1977).
101. 616 F.2d 212, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1039 (5th Cir. 1980).
102. Id. at 215, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1042-43.
103. Id. at 214, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1040.




impose on defendant a heavy burden, for he must find this evidence
largely through oral and documentary discovery of the opposing party's
employees and business records. However, we believe it would place an
undue burden on plaintiff-seller to require not only that he prove the
market under 2-708(1) but that he also prove that 2-708(1) will not
overcompensate him. 106
The Second Circuit, however, has recently taken the position that subsec-
tion (2) of section 2-708 need not be used to restrict windfalls under subsec-
tion (1). In a confusing opinion the court acknowledged that the market
formula of section 2-708(1) rarely reflects a seller's actual economic loss and
held that neither the language nor history of section 2-708(2) indicate that it
should apply to cases involving a section 2-708(1) windfall. 10 7 The court's
discussion did not address the question of whether the seller was left at lost
volume as a result of the breach. The court did say that it was not convinced
by the facts that the seller would be overcompensated by the market formula
of section 2-708(1).108 The court concluded that the market formula would
provide the seller the benefit of its bargain. 109 The court reasoned that, by
entering into an extended installment contract at a fixed price, the parties
were speculating on the market price of aluminum. 110 Because aluminum
prices subsequently plunged, the seller had won its bet, and the market
formula of section 2-708(1) would reflect the proper pay-off.111
The court distinguished its decision from that of the Fifth Circuit in the
Nobs Chemical case and reserved the question of whether it would have
reached the same result in Nobs Chemical. The court considered the cases
distinguishable because the seller in Nobs Chemical had contractually pro-
tected itself against market price fluctuation by immediately entering into a
second fixed price contract for the purchase of the goods to be supplied
under the first contract. 112 The court's reasoning is flawed by its failure to
note that the fixed price of the breached contract is what protects the seller
from the market price fluctuation. The contract guarantees to the seller the
profit it would have made on the contract regardless of any decline in the
market price. On the other hand, by entering into a fixed price contract, the
seller relinquishes its ability to take advantage of a rise in the market price.
A lost volume seller who receives the profit lost on the breached contract,
plus incidentals, is fully compensated for the loss caused by the buyer's
breach.1 13 Accordingly, no valid distinction exists between the Second Cir-
cuit case and the Fifth Circuit decision in Nobs Chemical. Furthermore, the
Second Circuit's reasoning that windfall damages are permissible under sec-
106. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 282.
107. Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902, 908, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1985).





113. Of course, if the seller is not at lost volume its damages must be mitigated by a resale
of the goods. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
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tion 2-708(1) is directly in the teeth of section 1-106, which expressly prohib-
its penal damages.1 14
III. CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
A. In General
If a buyer's breach has left a seller with completed goods but in a lost
volume situation, or with goods the manufacture or assembly of which has
not been begun or completed, the seller may base its recovery on the profit
formula of section 2-708(2). The formula provides for the following
calculation:
Profit (including reasonable overhead)
+ Incidental Damages
+ Costs Reasonably Incurred
- Payments or Proceeds of Resale
= Total Damages Under Section 2-708(2)
Exactly what each element of the formula means and how one goes about
proving the elements are unclear, and to date there is a dearth of helpful
appellate level decisions. 115
The basic component of the formula is the profit, including reasonable
overhead. Any calculation of this amount must begin with the contract
price of the breached contract. Usually, establishing the contract price will
present no difficulty, and often the parties will stipulate the price at trial.
Difficulties can arise, however, because the Code does not require an agreed
contract price as a prerequisite for a valid contract.1 16 If the parties have
114. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977).
115. In the words of Professors Summers and White:
So we await with anticipation the case that must even now be brewing some-
where in the court system which will pose a full-fledged disagreement between
plaintiff's accountant and defendant's accountant which will give us some in-
sight into how the courts should and will resolve disputes between the parties
over the definitions of profit, overhead, due credit, etc.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 288.
116. U.C.C. § 2-305 (1977) provides:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though
the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time
for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard
as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or
recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix
in good faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of the parties
fails to be fixed through fault of one party the other may at his option treat the
contract as cancelled or himself fix a reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price be
fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is no contract. In such a case
the buyer must return any goods already received or if unable so to do must pay
their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the seller must return any
portion of the price paid on account.
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not agreed upon a price, or means of determining the price, the court may fill
the gap with a price that is reasonable at the time and place of delivery. 117 If
the market for the goods is unstable, however, determining a reasonable
price may be a difficult matter. Other facts and circumstances of the partic-
ular case may exacerbate the problem. For example, if the contract price is
based on the quantity ordered, as in a requirements contract, the seller must
be able to prove at least the minimum quantity for which the buyer was
obligated. "18
Once the contract price is shown, the aggrieved seller is in a position to
prove the remaining increments of the formula. The following sections dis-
cuss in turn these remaining damage increments. The seller may prove the
profit, including reasonable overhead, by deducting from the contract price
the variable or direct costs that the seller would have incurred in performing
the contract. These variable costs should include not only the direct costs of
producing the goods, but also other variable costs borne by the seller, such
as costs of packing, labeling, and transporting the goods. A computation of
the contract price less the total variable or direct expenses produces the
profit figure, including reasonable overhead, contemplated by the formula.
The formula additionally allows the seller to recover all expenses incurred
in partially performing the contract and any incidental damages, as defined
by section 2-710, resulting from the buyer's breach. Further, the seller must
allow the buyer a credit for payments received from resale. This provision
requires that a deduction be made for any amounts that the seller receives
from a resale of partially manufactured goods as components or scrap.
B. The Recovery of Overhead
In non-Code cases the courts have disagreed on the question of whether
indirect, fixed costs, commonly known as overhead, are deductible from the
contract price in computing damages for lost profits. The courts often frame
the question in terms of whether the aggrieved plaintiff is entitled to gross
profits with no overhead deduction, or only net profits, which are gross prof-
its with overhead deducted. The weight of authority suggests that overhead
expense is not properly deductible in computing lost profits and that over-
head is properly recoverable as damages. The cases holding to the contrary
generally state no rationale except for the assertion that overhead is a cost
incurred in doing business.1 19 Section 2-708(2) specifically affirms the
weight of authority by providing that the seller's profit recovery should in-
117. Id. § 2-305(1).
118. Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 522 F.2d 469, 472, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1975); see also Flood v. M.P. Clark, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 970, 971,
9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1226, 1227-28 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (in requirements contract
damages should be based on buyer's actual requirements and not upon maximum amount for
which seller could be obligated).
119. The cases are collected in R. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS
§ 6.5 (2d ed. 1981); see also Annotation, Overhead Expense as Recoverable Element of Dam-
ages, 3 A.L.R.3d 689, 697-702 (1965).
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clude reasonable overhead. 120 The Code's provision for overhead is consis-
tent with the basic theory of section 1-106 that recovery should put an
aggrieved party in the position it would have occupied had the other party
performed the contract.
Fixed overhead expense is not a proper deduction in computing lost prof-
its because such expense exists regardless of the buyer's breach. By defini-
tion overhead expense is fixed in the sense that the seller continues to incur it
despite the buyer's breach. Such items as administrative salaries, utilities,
equipment depreciation, and taxes are common examples of overhead.
These expenses are distinguishable from variable expenses, such as labor,
materials, and transportation costs, which are directly attributable to the
breached contract and which are expenses that a seller is saved as a result of
the breach. In accounting terminology, which is often used in the reported
decisions, overhead expense is often referred to as fixed or indirect costs.
Expenses that are saved as a result of the buyer's breach are referred to as
direct or variable costs.
The rationale for not deducting overhead in computing lost profits is sim-
ply that overhead is not an expense saved as a result of the buyer's breach.
The rationale for allowing the seller to recover overhead expense as damages
is equally clear. Since overhead expense is fixed, if the seller cannot recover
as damages the proportionate part of the overhead that the breached con-
tract would have borne, the seller's overhead will be allocated over the re-
mainder of the seller's contracts, thereby reducing the profitability of those
other contracts. Judge Staley, in his well-known opinion in Vitex Manufac-
turing Corp. v. Caribtex Corp.,12 1 succinctly explained the proposition:
By the very nature of this allocation process, as the number of transac-
tions over which overhead can be spread becomes smaller, each transac-
tion must bear a greater portion or allocate share of the fixed overhead
cost. Suppose a company has fixed overhead of $10,000 and engages in
five similar transactions; then the receipts of each transaction would
bear $2,000 of overhead expense. If the company is now forced to
spread this $10,000 over only four transactions, then the overhead ex-
pense per transaction will rise to $2,500, significantly reducing the prof-
itability of the four remaining transactions.1 22
The Code cases, with virtual unanimity, are in agreement with this reason-
ing. 123 The only case to the contrary allowed the seller to recover only over-
120. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1977).
121. 377 F.2d 795, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 182 (3d Cir. 1967).
122. Id. at 799, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 186; see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 5, at 285 ("[A] contract with a theoretical net profit of zero may nevertheless carry
a substantial economic benefit to the contracting party.").
123. Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 869-70, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1669, 1675-77 (1st Cir. 1982); Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., v. Armour Phar-
maceutical Co., 629 F.2d 1118, 1125-26, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996, 1003-05 (5th
Cir. 1980); Unique Sys. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 373, 379, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1340, 1350 (8th Cir. 1980); Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 798, 4
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 182, 185 (3d Cir. 1967); Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI B.V.
v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846, 853-54, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 406,
413-15 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus.,
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head expense incurred up to the time of the buyer's breach. 124 The court's
decision is incorrect. To compensate the seller fully for its loss, the court
should have allowed the seller to recover the entire overhead that would
have been allocated to the breached contract.
1. Computation of Overhead
Section 2-708(2) uses the phrase "profit (including reasonable over-
head)."' 125 Notice that this language does not provide for profit plus over-
head, but rather carries the inference that the profit includes overhead.
Overhead will virtually always be a tacit part of the seller's recovery of gross
profits. The calculation of the profit portion of the section 2-708(2) formula,
then, is contract price less variable expenses. The resulting gross profit fig-
ure will include the proportionate part of the fixed overhead costs attributa-
ble to the breached contract. This method of calculation is consistent with
both the propositions that fixed overhead expenses are not expenses saved as
a result of a contract breach and that the aggrieved seller is entitled to re-
cover as damages that proportion of the overhead that the breached contract
was to bear.
This method of calculation, contract price less variable expenses, is widely
recognized by the reported decisions. Thus, in one case the court labeled the
allocation of overhead as a tacit award of damages to the seller. 126 The court
rejected the buyer's argument that, based on modern accounting principles,
overhead is as much a cost of doing business as any other expense. 127 The
court reasoned that the share of overhead allocable to a particular transac-
tion should not be considered a cost for purposes of computing lost profits
merely because those in business allocate such costs for planning
purposes. 1 2 8
144 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330, 1339-40, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802, 814 (Ct. App.
1984); Jericho Sash & Door Co. v. Building Erectors, Inc., 362 Mass. 871, 286 N.E.2d 343,
343-44, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1377, 1377-78 (1972); Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac,
Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 1078-80, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1047,
1054-56 (1978); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment f (1982) (lost
volume seller entitled to net profit).
124. Industrial Circuits Co. v. Terminal Communications, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 536, 216
S.E.2d 919, 923, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996, 1000 (1975) (relying on North Caro-
lina Supreme Court decision in Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 259 N.C.
400, 131 S.E.2d 9 (1963)).
125. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1977).
126. Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 799, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 182, 184-86 (3d Cir. 1967). The court stated:
First it must be recognized that the pro rata allocation of overhead costs is
only an analytical construct. In a similar manner one could allocate a pro rata
share of the company's advertising cost, taxes and/or charitable gifts. The point
is that while these items all are paid from the proceeds of the business, they do
not normally bear such a direct relationship to any individual transaction to be
considered a cost in ascertaining lost profits.
Id., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 186.
127. Id. at 798-99, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 185-86.
128. It is true that successful businessmen must set their prices at sufficient levels to
recoup all their expenses, including overhead, and to gain profits. Thus, the
price the businessman should charge on each transaction could be thought of as
1046 [Vol. 40
PROFIT FORMULA
Computing profit as contract price less variable expenses avoids the re-
dundancy of the seller having to prove total costs, including overhead, to
determine net profits and then adding back in overhead to determine gross
profits. It would be most onerous to require the seller to prove every one of
the fixed overhead costs, ranging from management salaries, utilities, and
the like, to matters that may be quite difficult to calculate, such as equipment
depreciation, and to matters that may vary by the month or year, such as
charitable contributions. The simplified method of calculation also avoids
having counsel for the buyer object at each opportunity that these fixed costs
of doing business were unreasonably incurred. The true fact of the matter is
that the reasonableness of particular overhead costs is of no relevance to the
defendant buyer. A vice president of the seller may, because of nepotism, be
paid an enormous salary that he or she in no sense earns. Although this
salary will affect the overall profitability of the business, it has no direct
effect on the profit that the seller would have earned on the breached con-
tract. 29 In effect, had the buyer not breached the contract, the seller would
have been able to use a portion of the gross profits from that contract to pay
a portion of the relative's outrageous salary. The seller should be compen-
sated for this loss.
Why then does section 2-708(2) use the term "reasonable overhead"? De-
spite the above analysis, this usage encourages a buyer to argue that the
buyer may, indeed, attack the reasonableness of every item of the seller's
fixed costs. Professor Hawkland has suggested that the purpose of the "enig-
matic" phrase "reasonable overhead" is to prevent the seller from making an
unreasonable allocation between fixed and variable cost categories. 130 For
example, labor costs attributable to the breached contract exemplify variable
costs that must be deducted to determine the seller's profit. What happens,
however, if the seller, as a matter of internal operating policy, places all its
labor force on fixed salary and, perhaps taking a page from the banking in-
dustry, gives each member of the force an administrative title? Obviously,
that price necessary to yield a pro rata portion of the company's fixed overhead,
the direct costs associated with production, and a "clear" profit. Doubtless this
type of calculation is used by businessmen and their accountants. However,
because it is useful for planning purposes to allocate a portion of overhead to
each transaction, it does not follow that this allocate share of fixed overhead
should be considered a cost factor in the computation of lost profits on individ-
ual transactions.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 869-70, 33
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1669, 1675-77 (1st Cir. 1982) (seller must deduct direct costs,
which includes wages and benefits of workers on contract goods); Automated Medical Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 629 F.2d 1118, 1125, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 996, 1003-05 (5th Cir. 1980) (seller may recover gross profit, which includes overhead
but not direct costs); Jericho Sash & Door Co. v. Building Erectors, Inc., 362 Mass. 871, 286
N.E.2d 343, 344, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1377, 1378 (1972) ("profit (including rea-
sonable overhead)" in statute is gross profit including fixed but not variable costs); Coast Trad-
ing Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 1079, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1047, 1054-56 (1978) (overhead not deductible in calculating lost profit).
129. Professor Hawkland, by a series of cogent illustrations, has mathematically demon-
strated this fact. See 3 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 13, § 2-708:04, at 331-38.
130. Id. at 337.
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this practice would greatly increase the seller's fixed costs of doing business.
May such a seller properly argue under section 2-708(2) that, because of its
unique internal policies, it need make no deduction for labor costs in manu-
facturing the contract goods? Professor Hawkland correctly concludes not,
stating that the seller's latitude in determining the nature of a particular cost
is subject to a rule of reason. 13
2. Variable Overhead Costs
Overhead costs are not always fixed. The costs can often vary with the
individual facts of the particular case. Accountants sometimes use the
phrase "variable overhead costs" to refer to such expenses.132
If for any reason the buyer's breach enables the seller to save costs that
normally would be fixed, such costs should be deducted in determining the
seller's section 2-708(2) lost profit award. Professor Hawkland's example of
fixed labor costs, discussed earlier, is a good example of such variable over-
head costs. In an analogous case the seller, in computing its lost profit, omit-
ted a deduction for the wages of employees who were to test the contract
goods. The seller argued that the breach did not affect the wages paid to the
testers. The court disagreed and held that the wages were not properly a
part of overhead and, thus, the seller should have deducted them from the
contract price. 133 The question of distinguishing between true overhead and
variable overhead may often produce substantial disputes at trial.134
A clearer example of a variable overhead cost is the cost of utilities to a
seller whose manufacturing plant is normally shut down, but is reopened
solely for the purpose of performing the breached contract. In such a case,
the costs of utilities, normally fixed and indirect, become directly attributa-
ble to the breached contract. Such costs are thus variable overhead. 135
A more difficult situation arises when the seller goes out of business subse-
quent to the buyer's breach, thereby saving expenses, such as utilities cost or
plant rental, that the seller would necessarily have incurred in performing
the breached contract. Again, because of the particular situation, normally
fixed expenses have become variable. The seller should not recover such
131. Reasonable overhead, then, means costs that reasonably are assigned to the
fixed expense category. In this respect, some latitude must be given to the busi-
ness judgment of the seller as to how costs should be allocated, but he must not
be permitted to inflate his recovery under subsection 2-708(2) by unreasonably
increasing his fixed expenses by including therein charges that clearly belong to
the variable cost category.
Id.
132. R. DUNN, supra note 119, § 6.5, at 110 (2d ed. Supp. 1986); see Roblin Hope Indus. v.
J.A. Sullivan Corp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 413 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (1980); see also J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 285 ("no unanimity among accountants about what is
overhead").
133. Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 870, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1669, 1676-77 (1st Cir. 1982).
134. Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., 144 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330, 1342, 39 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802, 817 (Ct. App. 1984).
135. See Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 798, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 182, 185 (3d Cir. 1967).
1048 [Vol. 40
PROFIT FORMULA
variable overhead expenses as damages; the expenses should be deducted
from the price of the breached contract. The sparse pre-Code case law ap-
parently endorsed this position.' 36 No Code case to date has directly re-
solved the question, but the courts have indicated that they will follow the
pre-Code rationale. 137
In short, there is logic to the proposition that a seller should not recover
for overhead expenses that it did not incur. If the seller discontinues busi-
ness, an overhead savings will often result. The situation becomes compli-
cated, however, when the seller is actually driven out of business by the
buyer's breach. This can happen when the buyer represents a significant
percentage of the seller's business. If the seller is forced to shut down as a
result of the buyer's breach, the seller may well save overhead expense yet at
the same time suffer substantial economic loss from contracts it could have
performed had it been able to continue in operation. Such losses, of course,
represent consequential damages. The Code makes no provision for a
seller's recovery of consequential damages, and the cases to date have denied
such recovery. 38 On the other hand, a buyer who argues that it is not re-
sponsible for the seller's consequential loss, but at the same time seeks a
deduction from the seller's damages for the overhead expenses that the seller
saved by being forced to discontinue business, reminds one of the child who
murders his parents and begs mercy of the court on the grounds that he is an
orphan. The first case to address these questions directly will be an interest-
ing one.
A final consideration in computing variable overhead expenses is that
fixed costs for overhead can vary according to the seller's level of produc-
tion. As production increases, more administrative staff may be necessary to
support and supervise labor. Additional production may mean opening ad-
ditional plants. If the buyer's breach causes a sufficiently significant decrease
in the seller's level of production, some overhead may become a variable cost
and should be treated as such. 139
136. See French v. Pullman Motor Car Co., 242 Pa. 136, 88 A. 876, 877 (1913); see also
Annotation, Overhead Expense as Recoverable Element of Damages, 3 A.L.R.3d 689 (1965).
137. In one case the court said:
Zotos argues, however, that a plaintiff who discontinues his business after a
breach of contract is not entitled to recover overhead expenses which would
have been incurred had the business continued. This may be the rule, but there
is no proof in the record that Unique Systems, Inc., has ceased to exist. Appar-
ently Zotos did not attempt to establish this fact at trial.
Unique Sys. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 373, 379, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1340,
1350 (8th Cir. 1980). Similarly, another case disallowed overhead deduction because the trial
court did not find any persuasive evidence that the breach caused a major work force reduction
or a plant shutdown. Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071,
1080, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1047, 1056 (1978).
138. See Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 216, 28 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1039, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. Thus, in one case the court said:
The allocation of overhead is particularly problematic because three centers
remained open after the breach.... On remand, the court must examine Auto's
1975 records to determine actual overhead expenses for 1975. Because Auto
closed three centers after the Armour breach, its overhead expenses in 1975 may
very well have varied considerably from the expenses incurred in previous years.
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C Costs Reasonably Incurred
If a seller properly discontinues manufacturing contract goods following a
buyer's breach, the seller may recover, in addition to the lost profit, the costs
reasonably incurred in partially performing the contract.' 40 Only by al-
lowing a recovery of such costs can the aggrieved seller attain the position it
would have occupied had the breached contract been performed. In our
recurring hypothetical, we have a contract price of $10,000 and total direct
costs of $9,000. Accordingly, the seller's profit including overhead would be
$1,000. Assume now that at the time of the buyer's breach the seller had
incurred $6,000 in direct costs of partially manufacturing the goods. As-
suming further that the partially manufactured goods are valueless, the
seller's damages obviously must account for the $6,000 out-of-pocket ex-
penses. Section 2-708(2) takes this factor into account by allowing the seller
to recover costs reasonably incurred. Thus, in the hypothetical, the seller
could recover a total of $7,000.
Suppose the seller cannot or does not marshal the necessary proof at trial
of what the total direct costs would have been in performing the breached
contract. In such a case clearly the seller has failed to prove its profit. May
the seller nevertheless recover the costs reasonably incurred in part perform-
ance? On the above facts, the seller would be asking for a $6,000 rather than
a $7,000 recovery. The seller would argue that, on the facts in the record,
the profit should be computed at zero and the costs reasonably incurred at
$6,000. Code section 1-106 directs courts to administer Code remedies liber-
ally; thus no reason to deny the seller the $6,000 recovery is apparent. This
recovery would certainly be allowed if the record demonstrated that the
seller's profit would actually have been zero, that is, if the seller's total direct
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 629 F.2d 1118, 1126,
30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1980). These kinds of complications may
explain the court's statement:
[T]he parties in this case interpret § 2-708(2) as entitling a seller to reasonable
overhead as a component of lost profits. We accept this position of the parties in
resolving their dispute. Because of the posture of the parties we take note of but
we need not and specifically do not adopt the rule of Vitex Manufacturing Corp.
v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 [4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 182] (3d Cir.
1967), to the effect that § 2-708(2) always entitles a seller to recover reasonable
overhead expense as an element of the damage award. We defer resolution of
that issue to the case in which it is presented to us as a disputed issue.
Id. at 1125 n.13, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1004 n.13. In a similar vein, another
court addresses the question of overhead varying according to the level of production nega-
tively, saying:
One other matter with respect to computation of such damages must be
noted. In view of our finding.., that production by plaintiff of the 958.887 tons
not accepted by the defendant would not have increased plaintiff's fixed costs
beyond the level required for production of [steel] strand accepted by defendant,
we hold that only plaintiff's variable costs of production should be considered in
computation of the net lost profits to which we find plaintiff entitled.
Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846, 854, 26
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 406, 414-15 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979);
see also Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071, 1080, 25
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1047, 1056 (1978) (overhead not affected by breach).
140. See U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1977).
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costs amounted to $10,000, the contract price. The partial measure of recov-
ery for expenses incurred in part performance is well established in contract
damage law outside the Code.'
4 1
This measure of recovery, however, presents a real danger of overcompen-
sating the plaintiff in cases in which full performance of the breached con-
tract would have resulted in a loss to the seller. Assume in the above
hypothetical that total direct costs of manufacture would have been $12,000
and that, because the contract price was only $10,000, the seller would have
lost $2,000 if the contract had been fully performed. To allow the seller a
recovery of $6,000 for costs reasonably incurred would place the seller in a
better position than it would have occupied had the buyer performed the
contract. The seller would escape the $2,000 loss. Accordingly, if the buyer
can show that the $2,000 loss would have occurred, the court should reduce
the seller's recovery by this amount. The recovery would then be $4,000:
the profit, a negative $2,000, plus the costs reasonably incurred, $6,000. Sec-
tion 333 of the Restatement of Contracts, which allows for the recovery of
expenses incurred in part performance, reaches this result. 14 2  Judge
Learned Hand said in a well-known case on point that the proposition is
simply that the court will not knowingly allow a recovery of expenses in-
curred so as to place the plaintiff in a better position than it would have
occupied had the contract been performed. 14 3 Although there are no Code
cases directly on point, cases outside the Code' 44 and the viewpoints of sev-
eral respected commentators 45 give strong indication that the same result
should obtain under section 2-708(2).
In cases involving recovery for expenses incurred on unprofitable con-
tracts, the buyer should carry the burden of proof on any loss that the seller
would have suffered. Pre-Code law also supports this position, 146 and the
Code rejects any doctrine that the injured party must prove damages with
mathematical precision. 147
141. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 333 (1932).
142. "If full performance would have resulted in a net loss to the plaintiff, the amount of
this loss must be deducted, the burden of proof being on the defendant." Id. § 333(d).
143. L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 1949), noted in
Annotation, Right to Recover, in Action for Breach of Contract, Expenditures Incurred in Prep-
aration for Performance, 17 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1951); see Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 75-80 (1936).
144. L. Albert & Sons v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 1949); Hough
v. Jay-Dee Realty & Inv., Inc., 401 S.W.2d 545, 550-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Security Stove &
Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express, 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S.W.2d 572, 576 (1932); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Electric Smith Constr. & Equip. Co., 4 Wash. App. 695, 483 P.2d 880, 885
(1971); Stolper Steel Prods. Corp. v. Behrens Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 478, 103 N.W.2d 683, 689
(1960).
145. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 282 n.79, 287 n.92; Peters, Remedies for
Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 274 (1963).
146. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 333(d) (1932).
147. U.C.C. § 1-106 comment 1 (1977).
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D. Due Credit for Payments or Proceeds of Resale
An irony regarding section 2-708(2) is that the section cannot be read
literally and still properly be applied to lost volume sellers, the group to
which the section is most often applicable. Section 2-708(2) concludes with
the requirement that the breaching buyer receive "due credit for payments
or proceeds of resale." 148 Taken on its face, this provision would require
that the buyer obtain credit for the amount received by the lost volume seller
upon resale of the goods. An illogical result follows: the seller is denied a
profit it would have otherwise earned. The seller's damage recovery would
be roughly that provided by section 2-706 or section 2-708(1),149 both of
which demonstrably do not compensate the lost volume seller.
The saving grace is that the drafting history of the provision makes clear
that the drafters only intended the due credit clause to allow the seller to
discontinue production and realize junk value on contract goods.' 50 The
due credit provision, then, applies only to the situation in which a seller, left
at breach with partially manufactured goods, sells the incomplete goods as
components or scrap. The cases151 and commentators 152 have universally
agreed with this interpretation of the provision.1 53
148. Id. § 2-708(2).
149. See National Controls, Inc. v. Commodore Business Machs., Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d
688, 697-99, 209 Cal. Rptr. 636, 642-43, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 12, 21 (1985);
Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618, 625-26, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1104, 1114 (1977).
150. SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 14 (1955) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT No. 1]; see also Neri
v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 399 n.2, 285 N.E.2d 311, 314 n.2, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165,
169 n.2, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 954 n.2 (1972) (citing New York
commentators).
151. Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 867-68, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1669, 1673-74 (1st Cir. 1982); Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251,
253-54, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 415, 416-18 (4th Cir. 1974); National Controls, Inc.
v. Commodore Business Machs., Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 688, 697-99, 209 Cal. Rptr. 636, 642-
43, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 12, 19-21 (1985); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & As-
socs., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618, 625-26, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1104,
1113-16 (1977); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 398-99, 285 N.E.2d 311, 314, 334
N.Y.S.2d 165, 169, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 954-55 (1972); see also Nederlandse
Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846, 853-54, 26 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 406, 413-15 (E.D.N.Y.) (seller not required to offset profit from third-
party sales against damages when not at lost volume), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979);
Comeq, Inc. v. Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc., 456 So. 2d 264, 267-69, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 488, 492-94 (Ala. 1984) (middleman seller allowed lost profits); Autonumerics,
Inc. v. Bayer Indus., 144 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330, 1339-41, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
802, 814-17 (Ct. App. 1984) (breaching buyer not to receive credit for resale proceeds when
seller is lost volume seller); Capital Steel Co. v. Foster & Creighton Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574
S.W.2d 256, 258-59, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1349, 1353 (1978) (seller may recover
lost profits when buyer breaches during manufacture).
152. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 277, 285; Harris, Sales Act Results,
supra note 7, at 99.
153. Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 868, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1669, 1674 (1st Cir. 1982). One court fully explained the matter as follows:
Logically, lost volume status, which entitles the seller to the § 2-708(2) formula
rather than the formula found in § 2-708(1), is inconsistent with a credit for the
proceeds of resale. The whole concept of lost volume status is that the sale of
the goods to the resale purchaser could have been made with other goods had
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A possible exception to this interpretation, an exception that is neverthe-
less conceptually consistent with it, occurs when the seller completes manu-
facture solely for the buyer's account so as to mitigate damages as required
in section 2-704(2). As previously demonstrated, 154 a seller with incomplete
goods on hand may, on occasion, be able to mitigate its loss by reselling the
goods, even at less than their total direct costs, if the seller can obtain a price
in excess of the sum of the direct cost to complete the manufacture plus the
amount it could receive by discontinuing manufacture and scrapping the
goods. 15 5 A seller who reasonably takes such action should not prejudice its
right to a recovery under the full section 2-708(2) formula, profit plus costs
less due credit. A seller who takes this course of action should, given the
general interpretation accorded the due credit provision, advise the buyer in
advance that the seller's course of action in completing manufacture is solely
for the buyer's account to mitigate the damages owed.
E. Incidental and Consequential Damages
Section 2-708(2) specifically provides for the seller's recovery of incidental
damages. Section 2-710 defines incidental damages to include "any commer-
cially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping de-
livery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's
breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise result-
ing from the breach." 1 .56 The cases have allowed sellers to recover a wide
there been no breach. In essence, the original sale and the second sale are in-
dependent events, becoming related only after breach, as the original sale goods
are applied to the second sale. To require a credit for the proceeds of resale is to
deny the essential element that entitles the lost volume seller to § 2-708(2) in the
first place-the mutual independence of the contract and the resale.
Practically, if the "due credit" clause is applied to the lost volume seller, his
measure of damages is not different from his recovery under § 2-708(1). Under
§ 2-708(1) he recovers the contract/market differential and the profit he makes
on resale. If the "due credit" provision is applied, the seller recovers only the
profit he makes on resale plus the difference between the resale price and the
contract price, an almost identical measure to § 2-708(1). If the "due credit"
clause is applied to the lost volume seller, the damage measure of "lost profits"
is rendered nugatory, and he is not put in as good a position as if there had been
performance.
The statutory history of the "due allowance-due credit" provision of § 2-
708(2) indicates that it was added to § 2-708(2) to cover a particular class of
sellers-the component parts assemblers/sellers. These are sellers who obtain
the component parts for special assembly on behalf of the buyer, who find it
useless to complete assembly after the buyer's breach. The "due credit" provi-
sion was intended to "clarify the privilege of the seller to realize junk value when
it is manifestly useless to complete the operation of manufacture." Apparently,
then, the "due credit" provision was intended to affect the rights of a particular
class of sellers, which class does not include the "lost volume seller."
Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618, 625-26, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1104, 1114-15 (1977) (footnotes omitted) (quoting SUPPLE-
MENT No. 1, supra note 150, at 14).
154. See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
155. Of course, such action by the seller will not mitigate its loss if it can better use its
production capabilities to perform other contracts.
156. U.C.C. § 2-710 (1977).
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variety of expenses incurred, including handling charges, 157 storage and
moving charges,1 58 finance charges,1 59 and upkeep and insurance charges. ' 60
The typical lost volume seller situation rarely will incur incidental dam-
ages. A basic condition to a seller's ability to prove lost volume status is that
the seller be able to show that it would have made the resale regardless of the
buyer's breach. In such cases, however, many of the expenses normally re-
coverable by sellers as incidental damages, such as expenses of reselling or
handling the goods, are incurred by the seller regardless of the buyer's
breach; therefore, the expenses do not result from the breach as required by
section 2-710. For this reason, lost volume sellers arguably have a narrower
range of incidental damages than do other sellers.
The Code makes no provision for a seller's recovery of consequential dam-
ages. Section 1-106161 and the cases to date162 indicate that a seller is to be
denied recovery for consequential loss. Nevertheless, some courts have ap-
parently made an attempt to avoid the potential unfairness of this denial by
adopting an expansive concept of incidental damages, labeling as incidentals
items that might be more correctly regarded as examples of consequential
loss. For example, in one case the court allowed the seller recovery for the
loss of byproducts that the seller would have produced had the buyer not
repudiated the contract and thereby prevented the seller from manufacturing
the contract goods. 163 The court allowed the recovery without identifying
any applicable provision of the Code. 164 The value of the byproducts was in
no sense a charge, expense, or commission as provided in section 2-710. The
same court, in an earlier opinion, had also allowed the recovery of finance
charges incurred on the contract goods. The buyer argued that only the
finance charges incurred subsequent to the contract breach could be re-
garded as incidental damages resulting from the breach under section 2-710.
The court, however, disagreed. 165
157. Great W. Sugar Co. v. Mrs. Allison's Cookie Co., 563 F. Supp. 430, 433, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 164, 166 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
158. Id.; Cesco Mfg. Corp. v. Norcross, Inc., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 837, 391 N.E.2d 270, 275,
27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 126, 132 (1979); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d
393, 400-01, 285 N.E.2d 311, 315, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
950, 955 (1972); Palmisciano v. Tarbox Motors, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 146, 151
(R.I. Super. Ct. 1984).
159. Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 401, 285 N.E.2d 311, 315, 334 N.Y.S.2d
165, 170, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 955 (1972).
160. Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 216, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1039, 1044 (5th Cir. 1980); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 401, 285
N.E.2d 311, 315, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 955 (1972).
161. Id. § 1-106(1) provides, in part, that "neither consequential or special nor penal dam-
ages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law."
162. Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 216, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1039, 1043 (5th Cir. 1980); Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. Petrobas v. Ameropan Oil
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 661, 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
163. Wallace Steel, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 739 F.2d 112, 115, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1665, 1668 (2d Cir. 1984).
164. Id.
165. Bulk Oil (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 697 F.2d 481, 484, 35 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983).
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F. Mitigation of Damages
Although the Code rarely addresses the matter, a basic principle of the
law of damages is that an aggrieved party cannot recover for any loss that
the party could have reasonably avoided. The Code has certainly not abol-
ished this so-called duty to mitigate damages; 166 the duty permeates the
Code through section 1-103, which preserves the applicability of the rules of
law and equity unless the rules are specifically displaced by a Code provi-
sion. 167 The defendant buyer has the burden of proof to show that the seller
has failed to act reasonably to minimize any loss. 168
This Article has previously discussed two examples of how a seller who
attempts to bring action under section 2-708(2) may be found to have failed
to mitigate damages. In the first instance, a full capacity seller, who has
completed goods on hand, must account to the breaching buyer for the pro-
ceeds of any resale of the goods. 169 If a full capacity seller unreasonably fails
to take advantage of an available resale, the seller will not recover for any
damages that could have been avoided by the resale.' 70 Second, mitigation
duties exist under section 2-704(2) for sellers left with incomplete goods on
hand at breach. ' 7' Such sellers will not, for example, recover as damages any
variable costs that could reasonably have been avoided by either completing
the goods or by discontinuing their manufacture, depending on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. 172
The seller need only act reasonably in attempting to mitigate the loss.
Thus, a court has held that a lost volume seller was not required to mitigate
its loss by accepting a breaching buyer's offer to buy less expensive goods. 173
Because the buyer's offer was unreasonably conditioned upon the seller's
surrender of its claim against the buyer for breach, the seller was not unrea-
sonable in rejecting the offer.' 74
A corollary in the law of damages to the duty to mitigate is the proposi-
tion that compensatory damages are measured at the least cost to the de-
fendant.' 75 Thus, in applying this principle one court held that because the
buyer could have elected to honor the contract by either making all the lease
166. Royal Store Fixture Co. v. Bucci, 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 696, 703, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1193, 1198 (County Ct. 1969).
167. TCP Indus. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 550, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
369, 379 (6th Cir. 1981); see also U.C.C. §§ 2-704(2), -715(2)(a) (1977) (promoting damage
mitigation).
168. TCP Indus. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 550, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
369, 379 (6th Cir. 1981).
169. See Publicker Indus. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 652 F.2d 340, 346, 32 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 449, 453 (3d Cir. 1981); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., Inc., 38
Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618, 625, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1104, 1114 (1977).
170. See Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 725, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1190, 1193 (Me. 1983); supra text accompanying notes 40-52.
171. See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
172. See Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272, 277, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 61, 66 (Ala. 1979).
173. Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 870, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1669, 1677 (lst Cir. 1982); see also U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977).
174. Teradyne, 676 F.2d at 870, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1677.
175. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 comment a (1932) states:
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payments on certain equipment or by exercising its option to purchase, cal-
culation of the seller's lost profits should be based on the purchase option
price and not on the larger amount of the total of eighty-four lease pay-
ments. 176 The court so held notwithstanding the fact that the breaching
buyer had not exercised the purchase option. 177 As with the law of damages
generally, mitigation requirements for aggrieved sellers under the Code will
be as varied as the contracts the sellers enter.
IV. LITIGATION ASPECTS OF SECTION 2-708(2)
A. Burdens of Pleading and Proof
A claim for the profit lost on a breached contract under section 2-708(2) is
one for general damages and not for special damages. In accordance with
the basic law of damages, a recovery based on the profit formula need not be
specially pled, and a general allegation of injury by breach of contract will
suffice. 178 The point is worth making because the Code's profit formula, as a
generally available remedy for aggrieved sellers, is new, and the courts his-
torically are accustomed to dealing with lost profits as special damages.
Thus, an occasional case incorrectly refers to an action under section 2-
708(2) as a request for special damages. 179 When an action for lost profits
takes the form of a claim for special damages it is because the claim is for
general business losses not directly related to the breached contract. Such
losses arise because of special circumstances of the plaintiff's situation and
must be specially pled. A good example is the buyer's claim for lost profits
as consequential damages under section 2-715(2)(a).180 A section 2-708(2)
claim, however, is not a claim for lost profits, but one for the particular
profit lost naturally and necessarily as a result of the breach. The claim does
not encompass unrelated and unanticipated transactions with third parties,
or a loss of business generally, but arises naturally and necessarily as a result
of the contract breach. Thus, a claimant need not specially plead section 2-
708(2) lost profit. A claim for incidental damages under section 2-708(2) is,
In awarding compensatory damages, the effort is made to put the injured
party in as good a position as that in which he would have been put by full
performance of the contract, at the least cost to the defendant and without
charging him with harms that he had no sufficient reason to foresee when he
made the contract. The various difficulties involved in this effort frequently
make it impracticable to attain its purpose with any near approach to exactness.
See also U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977) (remedies to be liberally administered to put aggrieved party in
as good a position as if other party fully performed, but consequential, special, or penal dam-
ages not allowed).
176. Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co., 646 P.2d 229, 237, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1678, 1683 (Alaska 1982).
177. Id.
178. See Hess Die Mold, Inc. v. American Plasti-Plate Corp., 653 S.W.2d 927, 929, 36
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1632, 1633-34 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ); Tennell v.
Esteve Cotton Co., 546 S.W.2d 346, 355, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 978, 984 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAM-
AGES 32-39 (1935).
179. Great W. Sugar Co. v. Mrs. Allison's Cookie Co., 563 F. Supp. 430, 433, 36 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 164, 165 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
180. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1977).
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on the other hand, a claim for special damages; therefore, a claimant must
specially plead such damages to avoid waiving the claim.
181
Because the lost profit claim under section 2-708(2) involves damages that
arise naturally and necessarily from the breach, foreseeability is not a factor
in determining whether to award such damages. By contrast, a section 2-
715(2)(a) claim for consequential damages does require foreseeability. 182 On
the rare occasion in which the courts have referred to the section 2-708(2)
claim in terms of foreseeability or the contemplation of the parties, the
courts have done so merely to note that the loss was foreseeable and within
contemplation. 183
Despite the procedural requirements, however, good practice dictates al-
leging with particularity in the pleadings the bases for the claim for general
damages. This practice may aid the trial court in understanding the gist of
the cause of action and following the relevancy of the evidence being intro-
duced. For example, the judge will better appreciate testimony about the
ability of the seller to make unlimited sales of goods if the judge understands
that the essence of the seller-plaintiff's claim is that the breach left the seller
at lost volume.
Regardless of the burden of pleading, the seller must carry the burden of
proving its entitlement to section 2-708(2) damages by showing that dam-
ages based on the market formula of subsection (1) do not place the seller in
the same position it would have occupied had the buyer not breached the
contract. The seller demonstrates the inadequacy of subsection (1) damages
by showing either that it was left at lost volume or with incomplete goods as
a result of the breach. The cases uniformly hold that a seller with completed
goods must prove its lost volume status to recover under the profit
formula.184 A seller who does not complete manufacture of the goods must
base a claim on the profit formula of section 2-708(2) because the courts will
deny recovery on an action for the price under section 2-709,185 on an action
for damages based on the resale formula under section 2-706,186 and on an
action for damages based on the market formula under section 2-708(1).' 87
The buyer has the burden of proof to show that the incomplete goods seller
should reasonably have mitigated damages by completing manufacture of
181. See Rodd v. W.H. King Drug Co., 30 N.C. App. 564, 228 S.E.2d 35, 37-38, 20 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 345, 348-49 (1976).
182. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1977).
183. See American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 101, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., Inc., 38 Md. App.
144, 380 A.2d 618, 624, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1104, 1112-13 (1977).
184. See Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 253-54, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1974); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., 144 Ariz. 181,
696 P.2d 1330, 1340, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802, 814 (Ct. App. 1984); Snyder v.
Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618, 624, 22 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1104, 1112 (1977).
185. See Rowland Meledandi, Inc. v. Kohn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 34, 35 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1969).
186. See Anderson, Plunging the Depths, supra note 11, at 421-24.




Professor Harris, who coined the term "lost volume," stated three ele-
ments of proof necessary for a showing of lost volume status: (1) the plaintiff
would have solicited the purchaser of the resold goods regardless of any
breach and resale; (2) the plaintiff's solicitation would have succeeded; and
(3) the plaintiff would have been able to perform that additional contract. 189
Although one court apparently held that a mere showing that the seller was
a retailer of goods was sufficient to show lost volume, 190 the court should
have required more convincing proof of lost volume. Accordingly, another
court denied a boat retailer recovery under section 2-708(2) because the re-
tailer did not sufficiently prove its lost volume status. A salesman for the
seller had testified at trial that the seller had an unlimited supply of the same
type of boat as that which the buyer had agreed to purchase. The court
found no other evidence in the record to substantiate this testimony.19' In-
stead, the court found testimony in the record that the seller told the buyer
that the boat that was the subject of the purchase agreement was the only
one available. 192 The seller resold the contract boat at the same price that
the breaching buyer had agreed to pay. On such conflicting evidence, the
court upheld the trial court's ruling that the seller had suffered no dam-
ages. 193 The seller had simply failed to carry its burden of proof.
To carry the burden of proof of lost volume status, the bright line test is
whether the seller would have made both the sale of the goods under the
breached contract and the subsequent sale to a third party. This test is es-
sentially the one proposed by Professor Harris 194 and recognized by a long
and growing line of judicial decisions. 195 Thus, one court concluded that "to
188. "The burden is on the buyer to show the commercially unreasonable nature of the
seller's action in completing manufacture." U.C.C. § 2-704 comment 2 (1977); see supra text
accompanying note 76.
189. Harris, Sales Act Results, supra note 7, at 82. In their attack on the proposition that a
lost volume seller should receive recovery under § 2-708(2), two commentators have argued,
inter alia, that the seller must also prove that the performance of an additional contract would
not increase its marginal costs above those that it would have incurred in performing the
breached contract. Goetz & Scott, supra note 13, at 332-54. Professor Wallach's response to
the point is the correct one: "This criticism may be accurate from an economist's perspective,
but it asks too much of the law." G. WALLACH, supra note 13, at 8-18.
190. Kaiserman v. Martin J. Ain, Ltd., 112 Misc. 2d 768, 768, 450 N.Y.S.2d 135, 135, 31
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1374, 1374 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
191. Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 463 N.E.2d 70, 73, 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 845, 849 (1983).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Harris, Sales Act Results, supra note 7, at 80-83.
195. See Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 868, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1669, 1674 (1st Cir. 1982); TCP Indus. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 552, 32 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 369, 382 (6th Cir. 1981); Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc.,
493 F.2d 251, 254, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1974); Nederlandse
Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846, 853, 26 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 406, 413 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979); Comeq, Inc. v.
Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc., 456 So. 2d 264, 268, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 488,
494 (Ala. 1984); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., 144 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330, 1340, 39
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802, 815 (Ct. App. 1984); National Controls, Inc. v. Commo-
dore Business Machs., Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 688, 698-99, 209 Cal. Rptr. 636, 643, 40 U.C.C.
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require proof of a market in which supply exceeds demand would be to re-
quire proof of a complex economic relationship that is not required" by sec-
tion 2-708(2). 196 The court refused to "impose rigid and complex burdens of
proof" and said that "to qualify as a 'lost volume' seller under § 2-708(2),
the seller needs to show only that it could have supplied both the breaching
purchaser and the resale purchaser."'
97
The general standard of proof by which any plaintiff, including a seller
seeking recovery under section 2-708(2), must prove entitlement to damages
is by a preponderance of the evidence. 198 Section 1-201(8) of the Code de-
fines the level of persuasion as follows: " 'Burden of establishing' a fact
means the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the
fact is more probable than its non-existence."' 99 The standard on appeal,
whether the trier of fact was a judge or a jury, is whether the finding of fact
was clearly erroneous. 2° °
Burden of proof in its broadest sense designates the party who must ulti-
mately establish by a preponderance of evidence the truth of the basic propo-
sition. 20 In a narrower sense, burden of proof refers to an obligation resting
on a party to go forward with the evidence to rebut an opponent's initial or
prima facie proof. The reference is often to the burden of going forward
with the evidence. The key distinction is that, in its broader sense, the bur-
den of proof always rests on the same party. The burden of going forward
with the evidence, in contrast, changes from party to party throughout a
trial.20 2 Proving actual lost volume status will be quite difficult in many
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 12, 19 (1985); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 400, 285
N.E.2d 311, 315, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 955 (1972).
196. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1290, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1985).
197. Id. (emphasis in original).
198. Cf. Deutscher v. Long (In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp.), 36 Bankr. 1010, 1013,
38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 531, 535 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (burden of establishing signa-
ture); Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 629, 646 (W.D. Ky.
1972) (burden of establishing defect and causation in breach of warranty action); Century
Appliance Co. v. Groff, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 226, 228 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1958) (burden
of establishing unauthorized completion); McCusker v. Fascione, 117 R.I. 478, 368 A.2d 1220,
1224, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 589, 590 (1977) (burden of establishing signature);
Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Holt, 216 Va. 500, 219 S.E.2d 881, 882, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 440, 440 (1975) (same).
199. U.C.C. § 1-201(8) (1977); see Transammonia Export Corp. v. Conserve, Inc., 554
F.2d 719, 723, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 301, 306 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 1-201(8) burden is
preponderance of the evidence); I.S. Joseph v. Citrus Feed Co., 490 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir.
1974) (burden of establishing oral contract is preponderance of the evidence).
200. Dangerfield v. Markel, 278 N.W.2d 364, 368, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 419,
424 (N.D. 1979) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(8)); see also Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson,
11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 463 N.E.2d 70, 72, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 845, 848 (1983)
(reversal requires error that shocks the senses).
201. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §§ 123-124 (1967).
202. FED. R. EvID. 301 provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the pre-
sumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the
risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast.
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cases; one commentator called it an almost impossible burden. 20 3 The trial
court can alleviate much of the difficulty by artfully manipulating the burden
of going forward with the evidence. Although the ultimate burden must rest
on the seller, once the seller has made a basic showing of lost volume status,
the burden of going forward with the evidence should fall upon the buyer
defendant. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supports this rea-
soning by placing the burden on the buyer of showing that the seller was not
left at lost volume by the breach once the seller has made an initial showing
of lost volume status.2 °4
The practicalities of proving actual lost volume status have led commenta-
tors to urge a relaxation of the burden of proof for the seller. 20 5 A perusal of
the decisions under the Code to date indicates that sellers have had no great
difficulty in proving their lost volume status by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.20 6 In one case, the court acknowledged that the seller's actual status
was a close question and noted that the ultimate determination on remand
was for the trier of fact under all the facts and circumstances. 20 7 The buyer
may, of course, effectively counter evidence of the seller's lost volume status
if the buyer can show either that the breach enabled the seller to make a
resale that otherwise could not have been made,20 8 or that the seller unrea-
sonably failed to mitigate damages by making such a sale.20 9
B. Requisite Precision of the Damage Calculation
To prove the amount of profit lost as a result of a breached contract, a
seller must introduce evidence of the contract price and offset that amount
with evidence of the direct costs of performing the contract. 210 If the seller
encounters evidentiary problems in marshalling the proof necessary for this
calculation, the problem likely will be with proving the actual direct costs
that the seller did or would have incurred in performing the contract. The
law of damages has always adopted a flexible attitude toward the degree of
certainty that an aggrieved party must meet to prove damages, and the
courts have long kept in mind that any uncertainty and inexactness is often
attributable to the fact that the defendant's breach has made difficult proof
203. G. WALLACH, supra note 13, at 8-18.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment f, illustration 16, § 350
comment d (1982).
205. G. WALLACH, supra note 13, at 8-18; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 282.
206. See cases cited supra note 195.
207. TCP Indus. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 552, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
369, 382 (6th Cir. 1981).
208. See Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 463 N.E.2d 70, 72, 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 845, 849 (1983); see also Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & As-
socs., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618, 625, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1104, 1113
(1977) (lost volume means sale to resale buyer could have been made regardless of breach);
Ned v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 314, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 169-70,
10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 950, 955 (1972) (§ 2-708 recognizes lost volume situation);
supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
209. See Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722, 726, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1190, 1194 (Me. 1983).
210. Royal Store Fixture Co. v. Bucci, 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 696, 702, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1193, 1198 (Pa. County Ct. 1969).
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of the costs that the seller would have incurred. 21 1
The Code's policy concerning the required precision for damage calcula-
tion is consistent with this traditional view and with the Code's own general
view that courts should liberally construe Code provisions in order to pro-
mote the purposes and policies underlying the Code.2 12 Section 1-106 pro-
vides that "[r]emedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to
the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed .... -213 Although the courts never allow
damage recoveries based on mere conjecture or speculation, 214 the courts, in
allowing recoveries for lost profits under section 2-708(2), have consistently
followed the policy reflected in comment 1 to section 1-106 by rejecting any
rule of mathematical precision in calculating damages.
215
211. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 178, at 102-17.
212. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (1977).
213. Id. § 1-106.
214. Palmisciano v. Tarbox Motors, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 146, 151 (R.I.
Super. Ct. 1984).
215. Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 870, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1669, 1677 (1st Cir. 1982) (damages need be proven only with definiteness and accuracy
permitted by facts); Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.,
629 F.2d 1118, 1126, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1980) (seller need
prove lost profit with reasonable, not mathematical, certainty); Unique Sys. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc.,
622 F.2d 373, 378, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1340, 1349 (8th Cir. 1980) (in new ven-
ture situation seller need prove amount of damages with reasonable degree of certainty; earn-
ings history not required); Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 217, 28
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1039, 1045 (5th Cir. 1980) (damages need be proven with rea-
sonable certainty, not with exactness); Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 798,
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 182, 184 (3d Cir. 1967) (difficulty in determining amount of
costs often arises because of buyer's repudiation before complete performance, ambiguities
should be decided against buyer); American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 16 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 101, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (rational basis for determining lost profit
required for new venture); Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karandanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 470, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 231, 236, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 36, 42 (1970) (lesser standard of certainty
required for proving amount of damage than required for proving fact of damage); Bead Chain
Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prods., Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 439 A.2d 314, 321, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 91, 100 (1981) (proof of damages need only be presented with reasonable cer-
tainty; buyer has no right to complain since difficulty in proof is due to its breach; remedies
should be liberally construed); Jericho Sash & Door Co. v. Building Erectors, Inc., 362 Mass.
871, 286 N.E.2d 343, 344, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1377, 1378 (1972) (damages need
only be proved with precision and accuracy permitted by facts and are at best approximate);
Rowland Meledandi, Inc. v. Kohn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 34, 35 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1969) (difficulty in proving amount of damage will not relieve buyer unless damages easily
ascertainable and seller fails to prove them); Paramount Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc. v.
Hughes Printing Co., 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 677, 694-95, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1129,
1140 (Ct. C.P.) (only reasonable estimate of lost profit with definiteness and accuracy permit-
ted by facts required; breaching buyer may not complain of lack of precision in calculation),
aff'd mem., 249 Pa. Super. 625, 377 A.2d 1001 (1977). Judge Peters, a noted commercial law
scholar writing for the Connecticut Supreme Court, assessed one situation as follows:
Viewing the evidence in this light, we cannot say that the trial court erred in
its determination of the amount of profits and overhead attributable to the con-
tract in breach. With regard to the loss of profits, Bead's president testified,
without objection, about the elements he considered in pricing the job for
Saxton. Under the Code, it is not fatal that his cost and price estimates about
the actual production run were necessarily theoretical, since Saxton's breach
made it impossible to go forward with the production that would have made
historically accurate figures available. Our cases have, in fact, long acknowl-
edged that opinion testimony is relevant evidence of loss of earnings and of good
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Nevertheless, courts have denied sellers' recovery for lost profit under sec-
tion 2-708(2) when the sellers failed to introduce any evidence as to costs. 2 16
One case has even upheld the trial court's denial of a recovery for overhead
because the seller did not carry its burden of proof as to the amount of such
loss.2 17 The court did not explain its decision. The conclusion is hard to
understand because the recovery of overhead is usually not proved directly,
but arises tacitly as part of a general recovery for gross profits. 2' 8
As discussed earlier, the lost profit formula under section 2-708(2) is not a
remedy for general business losses, but is only a recovery for the profit lost
on the particular breached contract. The seller need only show its contract
price and the direct costs it would have incurred on that particular contract.
If the seller can show that it could have performed the contract, it is of no
importance that the seller's business is new and unestablished. In this re-
gard, comment 2 to section 2-708 states, "[i]t is not necessary to a recovery
of 'profit' to show a history of earnings, especially if a new venture is in-
volved."' 2 19 An occasional case misses the point and apparently applies a
stricter standard to new businesses under section 2-708(2).220 To date, how-
ever, no case has denied a seller recovery under section 2-708(2) because the
business was new, unestablished, or lacking in prior earnings history.
The courts have been laudably patient with sellers who had definite sec-
tion 2-708(2) claims, but marshalled the claims with varying degrees of inco-
herence. Thus, in one instance in which the seller's attorney fervently
argued the case under everything but the applicable UCC provisions, the
court reframed the evidence in the record within the Code's provisions, de-
termined that the seller was entitled to a lost profit recovery under section 2-
708(2), and upheld the trial court's award. 22 1 Unfortunately for the seller,
will. There is no reason why lost profits cannot be similarly established. Bead's
president based his estimates on his experienced view of the equipment that
would be required, the difficulty of maintaining production, and the time re-
quired for the job. Having taken account of these and related factors, he built a
20 percent profit into the contract price of $13.95 per thousand units. The
award of $3000 lost profits on a contract for 5,000,000 units at a total contract
price of approximately $70,000 was therefore well within the supporting
evidence.
Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prods., Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 439 A.2d 314, 321, 31 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 91, 100-01 (1981) (citations omitted). Similarly, in another case the
court upheld the trial court's "conservative estimate" of lost profit based on the evidence avail-
able in the record. Unique Sys. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 373, 379, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1340, 1349 (8th Cir. 1980).
216. See Royal Store Fixture Co. v. Bucci, 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 696, 701-03, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1193, 1198 (Pa. County Ct. 1969); Rowland Meledandi, Inc. v. Kohn, 7
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 34, 35 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969).
217. Copymate Mktg., Ltd. v. Modem Merchandising, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 300, 660 P.2d
332, 333, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 161, 164 (1983).
218. See supra text immediately following note 118.
219. U.C.C. § 2-708 comment 2 (1977).
220. See Unique Sys. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 373, 378, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1340, 1349 (8th Cir. 1980); see also American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 16
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 101, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (rational basis for determining lost
profit required for new venture).
221. Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prods., Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 439 A.2d 314, 320, 31
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 91, 99 (1981).
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the evidence indicated that, had the seller properly presented the case under
section 2-708(2), the seller's award would have been much larger. 222 Simi-
larly, in another case, the court upheld damages of $4,285, which had been
requested by the seller and awarded by the trial court. In its opinion the
court noted that, had the action been properly framed under section 2-
708(2), the damage award would have been in excess of $6,000.223 Even the
most helpful of courts, however, can do only so much. Thus, in another case
a seller of incomplete goods was properly denied an action for the price and
then was denied recovery altogether when it introduced no evidence upon
which the court could calculate damages under section 2-708(2).224
V. CONCLUSION
Under the Code's scheme the profit formula of section 2-708(2) is truly
the dominant damage remedy for aggrieved sellers who suffer a breach prior
to the time that the buyer accepts the goods. The formula applies to most
commercial sellers because such sellers are usually left in a lost volume situa-
tion by a buyer's breach. The profit formula also applies in all cases in
which a seller properly decides not to complete manufacture of the goods
after the buyer breaches the contract. The courts have come to allow the
profit formula as a matter of course in all lost volume and incomplete goods
cases. Further, the courts have properly taken a relaxed attitude toward the
burden of proof that the seller must carry to establish either lost volume
status or the propriety of a decision to discontinue manufacture of the goods
under the guidelines of section 2-704. Accordingly, as the trial bar becomes
more familiar with the mechanics of proving damages under section 2-
708(2), the profit formula promises to become the most widely used of sell-
ers' damage remedial alternatives under the Uniform Commercial Code.
222. Id. at 320-21, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 99-101.
223. Chicago Roller Skate Mfg. Co. v. Sokol Mfg. Co., 185 Neb. 515, 177 N.W.2d 25, 27, 7
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 804, 806 (1970).
224. Rowland Meledandi, Inc. v. Kohn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 34, 35 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1969).
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